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I. INTRODUCTION
It is undisputed th at expert testimony is a significant factor in modem
litigation. Many cases--especially those involving complex issues of
causation-often boil down to a "battle of the experts." As the Supreme Court
of Missouri once observed, expert witnesses "play as great a role in the
organization and shaping and evaluation of their client's case as do the
lawyers."' Products liability litigation typically requires testimony by engineers,
personal injury cases require expert medical testimony, and economists and
accountants are asked to value damages in a wide variety of disputes. A number
of disciplines or professions now include forensic specialties. Expert testimony
is "big business."2
Many experienced trial lawyers might reasonably ask, "so what?" Our
adversary system certainly permits parties to do all that they ethically can to
advance their positions. Employing expert witnesses who will offer favorable
opinion testimony is but one form of zealous advocacy. Almost all litigants have
nearly unlimited access to a wide variety of experts, and opposing experts are
always subject to cross-examination.
This pragmatic approach to expert testimony, appealing though it may be,
ignores the judicial perspective and overlooks broader evidentiary concerns.
First, expert testimony which borders on the fantastic, or which is wholly
incredible, undermines the integrity of the adversary system? Second, an expert
witness should not be a party's advocate. Experts should not be the litigation
equivalent of hired guns. Rather, as the Selvidge v. United States4 court
observed: "An expert witness should be an advocate of the truth with testimony
to help the court and the jury reach the ultimate truth in a case, which should be
the basis of any verdict."5 If this view is naive,6 it nonetheless represents the
* Partner, Armstrong Teasdale Schlafly & Davis, Kansas City, Missouri. B.S.,
Fort Hays State University; M. Ed., University of Nebraska; J.D., University of Kansas.
1. Murphy v. A.A. Mathews, 841 S.W.2d 671,682 (Mo. 1992).
2. Kathy J. Cook, Reviving the Dying Spirit of Rule 704: Putting the Legal
Conclusion Doctrine to Rest, 62 DEF. CouNs. J. 564, 564 (1995) (noting that the largest
expert referral service in the United States lists "22,500 experts willing to testify on some
5,500 subjects, including ear print identification, unidentified flying objects and wigs");
see also Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575, 582 (D.N.J. 1994) ("The
business of being an expert has become a cottage industry.").
3. See Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374,410-15 (D. Kan. 1984).
4. 160 F.R.D. 153 (D. Kan. 1995).
5. Id. at 156 (citing Van Blargan v. Williams Hospitality Corp., 754 F. Supp. 246,
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prevailing federal perspective.! Third, expert witnesses merit special attention
because their testimony can be powerful and simultaneously very "misleading
because of the difficulty in evaluating it."8 Absentjudicial guidance, jurors may
"abdicate their fact-finding obligations" and, instead, simply adopt the opinions
of the expert witnesses whose testimony they find persuasive.'
Expert testimony often becomes a point of contention in cases in which an
expert witness is alleged to be a "professional expert." Professional experts
usually are compelling witnesses whose primary function is persuading the jury;
the expert's demeanor, personality and communications skills are far more
important than the subject of the expert's testimony. Professional expert
witnesses freely change their theories and qualifications to suit their immediate
employers."0 For example, an industrial engineer testifying for a plaintiff in a
products liability case might claim to have specialized training in "human
factors," thus allowing him to opine about the adequacy of the manufacturer's
warnings. In another products liability case that same industrial engineer might
claim to have extensive experience or education in mechanical engineering, thus
permitting him to testify that a machine was defectively designed. Professional
248 (D.P.R. 1991)); see also Tyus v. Urban Search Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256,263 (7th Cir.
1996) (in all cases a district court "must ensure that it is dealing with an expert, not just
a hired gun"), cert. denied, No. 96-1558, 1997 WL 155485 (June 2, 1997); English
Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1501 (D. Colo. 1993) ("Experts
are not advocates in the litigation but are sources of information and opinions."); Van
Blargan v. Williams Hospitality Corp., 754 F. Supp. 246,249 (D.P.R. 1991) ("An expert
witness should never become solely one party's expert advocate nor a 'gun for hire.'
Rather, an expert witness should be an advocate of the truth with testimony to help the
jury and the Court reach the ultimate truth... which is the basis of any verdict.").
6. See PEr,.W. HUBER, GALmEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
18 (1991) ("'I would go into a lawsuit with an objective uncommitted independent
expert... about as willingly as I would occupy a foxhole with a couple of noncombatant
soldiers."') (quoting a former American Bar Association president). The late Melvin
Belli once observed: "'If I got myself an impartial expert witness, I'd think I was
wasting my money."' Id.
7. See, e.g., Kirk v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 163-64 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding that expert testimony for same party in different case cannot constitute an
admission by that party because expert witnesses are independent, and their testimony
is not subject to their clients' control), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1015 (1996).
8. Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It
ShouldNot Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991).
9. Charles R. Richey, Proposals to Eliminate the Prejudicial Effect of the Use of
the Word "Expert" Under the Federal Rules of Evidence in Civil and Criminal Jury
Trials, 154 F.R.D. 537, 541 (1994).
10. See Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Grove Mfg. Co., 958 F.2d 1169, 1174-75
(Ist Cir. 1992) (engineering expert testified in 18 dissimilar fields).
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experts' testimony tends to mislead juries, prolong litigation and unnecessarily
increase litigation expense.
Novel scientific testimony sprouts like weeds. Some scientific testimony
borders on the absurd. A college anthropology professor who appeared as an
expert witness in more than twenty criminal cases in eleven states and Canada
claimed to be able to match a footprint on any surface to the person who made
it." Her claims were later debunked, with one observer describing them as
"'complete hogwash."' 2 A forensic dentist from Mississippi, Dr. Michael H.
West, claims to be able to match human bite marks with the teeth that made them
through the use of ultraviolet light. 3 The problem with Dr. West's ostensibly
plausible technique is that he "sees things under [ultraviolet light] that he cannot
document and that nobody else can see."' 4
Far more mainstream areas than footprint matching and the forensic use of
"blue light' regularly challenge courts and juries. Perhaps the hottest scientific
evidence topic is psychological syndrome evidence.' A "syndrome" is a "set
of symptoms which occur together."' 6 Unlike diseases, syndromes follow no
specified temporal course, nor is their pathology clear, making them common
litigation topics. Many psychological syndromes have become the continuing
subject of expert testimony. These include child sexual abuse accommodation
11. Mark Hansen, Believe It or Not, A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 64, 64.
12. Id.
13. Mark Hansen, Out of the Blue, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 50, 51.
14. Id
15. See generally Krista L. Duncan, Note, "Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics"?
Psychological Syndrome Evidence After Daubert, 71 IND. L.J. 753 (1996); James T.
Richardson et al., The Problems of Applying Daubert to Psychological Syndrome
Evidence, JUDICATURE, July-August 1995, at 10; John E. B. Myers, Expert Testimony
Describing Psychological Syndromes, 24 PAC. L.J. 1449 (1993); Charles Bleil, Evidence
of Syndromes: No Needfor a "Better Mousetrap," 32 S. TEX. L.J. 37 (1990).
16. DoRLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1629 (27th ed. 1988).
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syndrome, 7 rape trauma syndrome,' battered woman syndrome,19 post traumatic
stress disorder, parental alienation syndrome,"1 and false memory syndrome. 2
17. Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, or CSAAS, describes five
characteristics commonly observed in sexually abused children: (1) secrecy; (2)
helplessness; (3) entrapment and accommodation; (4) delayed, conflicted and
unconvincing disclosure of abuse; and (5) retraction of abuse claims. John E. B. Myers
et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REv. 1, 66-67
(1989). CSAAS does not detect sexual abuse; rather, it assumes the existence of abuse
and explains the child's reactions. See id at 67. The syndrome is described-and has
been hotly contested-in anumber ofcases. See, e.g., Gierv. Educational Sere. Unit No.
16, 845 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Neb. 1994), if'd, 66 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995); People v.
Patino, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 345 (Ct. App. 1994); Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490 (Ind.
1995); Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 612 (Ky. 1992); State v. Foret, 628 So.
2d 1116 (La. 1993); Peoplev. Peterson, 537N.W.2d 857 (Mich. 1995); Statev. J.Q., 617
A.2d 1196 (NJ. 1093); Kahre v. Kahre, 916 P.2d 1355, 1363-64 (Okla. 1995); State v.
Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 561-63 (Tenn. 1993); Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741 (Wyo.
1993).
18. See, e.g., State v. Ali, 660 A.2d 337, 349-52 (Conn. 1995); State v. Alberico,
861 P.2d 192 (N.M. 1993); People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 1990); see also
Duncan, supra note 15, at 759-63; Jennifer J. Hackman, Comment, Henson v. State:
Rape Trauma Syndrome Used by the Defendant as Well as the Victim, 19 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 453 (1995).
19. See generally Bleil, supra note 15, at 48-51; Duncan supra note 15, at 763-67.
Cases discussing battered woman syndrome include UnitedStates v. Brown, 891 F. Supp.
1501, 1506-08 (D. Kan. 1995) (expert testimony allowed), State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d
793, 798-99 (Minn. 1989) (expert testimony allowed with restrictions), State v. Thomas,
423 N.E2d 137,139-40 (Ohio 1981) (expert testimony excluded), and State v. Riker, 869
P.2d 43, 47-50 (Wash. 1994) (testimony admissible only in certain circumstances).
20. See generally Duncan, supra note 15, at 757-59. Several syndromes, such as
rape trauma syndrome, are in fact subcategories of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
See Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social
Framework Testimony, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 133, 155; Duncan,
supra note 15, at 761. For a case discussing the overlap between PTSD and rape trauma
syndrome, and essentially using the terms interchangeably, see Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d
1289 (Md. 1995).
21. See, e.g., Wiederholt v. Fischer, 485 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. Ct. App.), review
denied, 491 N.W.2d 767 (Wis. 1992). "Parental alienation syndrome" may involve (1)
one parent actively brainwashing or manipulating the child's feelings toward the other
parent; (2) one parent unconsciously rewarding a child for turning his or her affection
away from the other parent; (3) children alienating themselves based on a fear of a loss
of love; or (4) children alienating themselves because of certain "situational factors.' Id.
at 444 n.1.
22. "False memory syndrome" refers to a condition in which the victim's
personality or identity and personal relationships revolve around a traumatic memory
which is objectively false, but in which the person strongly believes. False memory
19971
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Expert testimony on psychological syndromes presents special problems for
courts evaluating its admissibility because (1) it embraces vague profiles and
symptoms; (2) courts have no way of verifying experts' conclusions; (3) experts'
evaluations of syndrome sufferers are essentially an art form; and (4) cross-
examination is of questionable value when it comes to exposing unreliable
elements in challenged experts' theories.21
Courts have not stood still in the face of what appears to be an expert
witness explosion. The Supreme Court formulated detailed guidelines for the
admission of scientific evidence in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.24 The 1993 amendments to the Fedbral Rules of Civil Procedure expanded
parties' disclosure requirements concerning expert witnesses, theoretically
enhancing parties' ability to prepare for and combat opposing experts. ' Even
so, the admissibility of expert testimony and the control or regulation of expert
syndrome is linked to "repressed memories" and "recovered memories" of alleged
childhood sexual abuse.
Cases discussing repressed and recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse
include Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F3d I (1st Cir. 1995), Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F. Supp. 286
(D. Mass. 1996), Borawickv. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Conn. 1994), affd, 68 F.3d
597 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1869 (1996), Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877
F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1995), State v. Hungerford, Nos. 94-S-045 to 94-S-047, 93-S-
1734 to 93-S-1936, 1995 WL 378571 (N.H. Super. Ct. May 23, 1995), and S. V. v. R. V,
933 S.W.2d 1, 8-20 (Tex. 1996).
There is also abundant literature on this topic. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman
& Elizabeth Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: LegalIntervention in SexualAbuse Survivor
Therapy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 549 (1996); Jacqueline Hough, Note, Recovered Memories
of Childhood SexualAbuse: Applying the Daubert Standard in State Courts, 69 S. CAL.
L. REy. 855 (1996); Douglas R. Richmond, Bad Science: Repressed and Recovered
Memories of Childhood SexualAbuse, 44 KAN. L. REV. 517 (1996); Emily E. Smith-Lee,
Note, Recovered Memories of Childhood Abuse: Should Long-Buried Memories Be
Admissible Testimony?, 37 B.C. L. REV. 591 (1996); Rola J. Yamini, Note, Repressed
and Recovered Memories of Child SexualAbuse: TheAccused as "Direct Victim,"47
HASTINGS L.J. 551 (1996); Joy Lazo, Comment, True or False: Expert Testimony on
Repressed Memory, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1345 (1995); Julie M. Kosmond Murray,
Repression, Memory and Suggestibility: A Callfor Limitations on the Admissibility of
Repressed Memory Testimony in SexualAbuse Trials, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 477 (1995);
Christina Bannon, Comment, Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: Should
the Courts Get Involved When Mental Health Professionals Disagree?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
835 (1994); Monica L. Hayes, Note, The Necessity of Memory Experts for the Defense
in Prosecutions for Child SexualAbuse Based Upon Repressed Memories, 32 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 69 (1994).
23. See State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 700-01 (N.H. 1993).
24. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
25. See generally Gregory P. Joseph, Emerging Expert Issues Under the 1993
Disclosure Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 164 F.R.D. 97 (1996).
[Vol. 62
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witnesses remain troublesome issues. Courts have not analytically shifted far
from where they were before Daubert; expert testimony is still liberally
admitted. Judges may lack the scientific understanding necessary to accurately
evaluate many forms of expert testimony. Some behavioral and social science
principles may not lend themselves to Daubert-type inquiry. The 1993
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have "spawned several
novel and nettlesome questions." 26 "Professional expert" witnesses cannot
always be identified. Additionally, relatively new expert issues--such as
conflicts of interest-are becoming increasingly important.
This Article attempts a broad examination of modem expert witness
practice, and judicial efforts to regulate or control expert testimony. Its
foundation is the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure; the Federal Rules are a valuable standard, and many states have
adopted them in some form. Part I examines expert testimony under the Rules
of Evidence, while Part H analyzes the expert disclosure requirements imposed
by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Part III discusses conflicts of interest. Finally,
Part IV examines limitations on the fees expert witnesses may charge.
I. EXPERT TESTIMONY UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Federal courts once required expert testimony if the subject matter was
"beyond the ken" of ordinary jurors. The "beyond the ken" standard called for
specialized knowledge to resolve problems with which lay people are
unaccustomed to dealing.27 Expert testimony could not be so complex or novel,
however, that it was not generally accepted in the subject scientific or
professional community. Now, expert testimony in federal courts must be
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.? Six closely intertwined rules
govern the testimony of expert witnesses: Rule 104(a), Rule 702, Rule 703,
Rule 705, Rule 403 and Rule 7042 These rules offer an integrated approach to
regulating expert testimony.
26. Id. at 97.
27. See United States v. Porter, 9 F.2d 153, 161 (E.D. Mich. 1925).
28. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
29. The Federal Rules of Evidence significantly expanded the admissibility of
expert testimony by eliminating common law restrictions. Faust F. Rossi, The Federal
Rules ofEvidence-Past, Present, and Future: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 28 LoY. L.A.
L. REv. 1271, 1271 (1995).
30. These rules are listed in the order in which this Article discusses them, and as
they are logically ordered for judicial consideration.
19971
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A. Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a)
The admissibility of evidence often turns on the answer to a preliminary
fact question. Does a witness have personal knowledge of a matter? Is a
document authentic? Was a declarant's statement made under the stress of
excitement caused by the event at issue? Does a document qualify as a business
record? Rule 104(a) assigns to trial judges the responsibility for resolving
preliminary questions of admissibility?' Rule 104(a) provides:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a witness, the existence
of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court.... In making its determination [the court] is not bound by the rules of
evidence except those with respect to privilege.32
Trial courts must make preliminary determinations concerning expert
witnesses' qualifications and the admission of expert testimony generally.33
Before admitting expert testimony, the trial court must conclude that the
proposed testimony (1) constitutes scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the
trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.14 These preliminary
determinations are intended to ensure the reliability and the relevance of the
expert testimony2s A trial court need not make its Rule 104(a) determination on
the record; appellate courts assume that district courts perform such analyses sub
silentio.6
Rule 104(a) requires a party wishing to challenge expert testimony to do so
prior to its admission. Most courts prefer such challenges to be made well before
trial, with motions in limine the preferred means? A trial court's failure to
preliminarily assess expert testimony is reversible error;38 however, the standard
of review does not favor the challenging party. A trial court's failure to fulfill
31. United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1077 (5th Cir. 1996);
Haggerty v. Upjohn Co., 950 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
32. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
33. Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry., 105 F.3d 299, 303 (6th Cir. 1997); Holbrook v.
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777,781 (3d Cir. 1996); Dickerson v. Cushman, Inc., 909
F. Supp. 1467, 1472 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
34. United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1341 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)); Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden
Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1230 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at
592).
35. United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844,849 (3d Cir. 1995).
36. Houltv. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995).
37. See, e.g., Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594,596 (9th Cir. 1996).
38. See, e.g., Grucav. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 51 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1995).
[Vol. 62
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its Rule 104(a) obligation with respect to expert testimony is reviewed only for
"clear error" or "plain error" affecting the parties' substantial rightsO
B. Federal Rule ofEvidence 702
Rule 702 is the critical evidentiary base for all expert testimony. Rule 702
mandates qualified expert witnesses while broadly stating those circumstances
in which their testimony is admissible: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise."'4 Helpfulness to the trier of fact is generally regarded as the
touchstone of admissibility under Rule 702. 1 Expert testimony is presumptively
helpful unless it concerns matters within lay jurors' everyday knowledge and
experience 2 Expert testimony is properly excluded "when it is not needed to
clarify facts and issues of common understanding which jurors are able to
comprehend for themselves."43 After all, a witness 'who knows no more than
the average person is not an expert.""
Whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is a matter committed
to the trial court's discretion.45 Before admitting expert testimony, a district
39. Cookv. American S.S. Co., 53 F.3d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 1995) ("clear error");
Quinton v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 335,337 (10th Cir. 1991) ("plain error").
40. FED. R. EvED. 702.
41. Hardin v. Ski Venture, Inc., 50 F.3d 1291, 1296 (4th Cir. 1995); Thompson v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 34 F.3d 932,941 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Werth v. Makita
Elec. Works, Ltd., 950 F.2d 643, 648 (10th Cir. 1991)). One court has taken a slightly
different view, concluding that the touchstone of admissibility under Rule 702 is
"reliability," rather than helpfulness. United States v. Rouse, 100 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir.
1996).
42. Kopfv. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374,377 (4th Cir. 1993).
43. Hibiscus Assocs. v. Board of Trustees, 50 F.3d 908, 917 (11th Cir. 1995); see
also CMI-Trading, Inc. v. Quantum Air, Inc., 98 F.3d 887, 890 (6th Cir. 1996) (jurors
competent to determine contracting parties' intent; expert testimony unnecessary);
Roback v. V.I.P. Transp. Inc., 90 F.3d 1207, 1215 (7th Cir. 1996) ("any juror" could
understand subject without expert assistance); London v. MAC Corp., 44 F.3d 316, 318
(5th Cir. 1995) (expert subject was "common knowledge"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 99
1995); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 51 F.3d 834, 842 (9th Cir. 1995); Justice
v. Carter, 972 F.2d 951, 956-57 (8th Cir. 1992); Persinger v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 920 F.2d
1185, 1188 (4th Cir. 1990).
44. Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 1992).
45. Huval v. Offshore Pipelines, Inc., 86 F.3d 454,457 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Banks v. McGougan, 717 F.2d 186, 190 (5th Cir. 1983)); McClaran v. Plastic Indus.,
Inc., 97 F.3d 347, 357 n.8 (9th Cir. 1996). Whether an expert is qualified to so testify
19971
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court should assure itself "that the expert knows whereof he speaks."46 Expert
witnesses may be precluded from testifying on subjects beyond their area of
expertise even where the subjects fall within their general professional practice
area.47 If a proposed expert witness lacks specialized education or training,
general experience in the subject field may not be sufficient qualification. Years
of experience in a subject area alone will not automatically qualify a person as
an expert on that subject4s By the same token, satisfactory academic or
necessarily depends on the facts of the particular case and on the expert's credentials or
qualifications. It is impossible to predict the outcome of related judicial inquiries;
however, there are a number of cases addressing expert witnesses' qualifications. See,
e.g., Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz, Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 476-77 (1st Cir. 1997) (certified
master mechanic not qualified to opine about automobile transmission design defect);
Barrettv. Atlantic Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 382-83 (5th Cir. 1996) (ecologist whose
expertise was limited to rats and their exposures to toxins was not qualified to testify
about toxic effects of chemicals on humans); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 80
F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir.) (land use planner not qualified to value property because he was
not an appraiser, notwithstanding familiarity with project), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293
(1996); London v. MAC Corp., 44 F.3d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 1995) (witness not qualified
to testify about machine's operation because he was not an engineer); Satcher v. Honda
Motor Co., 52 F.3d 1311, 1317-18 (5th Cir. 1995) (motorcycle policeman qualified to
testify about motorcycle rider's leg protection in products liability action even though he
was not an engineer), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 705 (1996); Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc.,
65 F.3d 725,734-35 (8th Cir. 1995) (expert's qualifications were "impressive"-district
court did not abuse its discretion by permitting hiin to testify), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1268 (1996); United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1075 (10th Cir. 1994) (specially
trained FBI agent qualified to testify as DNA expert); Edmonds v. Illinois Cent. Gulf
R.R., 910 F.2d 1284, 1286-87 (5th Cir. 1990) (clinical psychologist not qualified to
testify about physiological effects of stress); Stull v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1271,
1275 (8th Cir. 1990) (mechanical engineer not qualified to testify about human anatomy).
46. Bammerlin v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 30 F.3d 898, 901 (7th Cir. 1994).
47. See, e.g., Maher v. Continental Cas. Co., 76 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1996)
(CPA not permitted to make economic predictions for business); Morse/Diesel, Inc. v.
Trinity Indus., Inc., 67 F.3d 435, 444 (2d Cir. 1995) (accountant could not testify about
cost allocations because they were beyond her field of expertise); Everett v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., 949 F. Supp. 856, 857-58 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (family medicine practitioner
not qualified to testify about toxicology); In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 911 F. Supp.
775, 797-98 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (meteorologist found not qualified to testify about
estimated doses of radioactive gases); Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp.
1528, 1533 (D. Kan. 1990) (pulmonary specialist attempted to testify about toxic
exposure).
48. See, e.g., Pedrazav. Jones, 71 F.3d 194,197 (5th Cir. 1995) (refusing to allow
30-year heroin addict to testify as an expert on heroin withdrawal when affidavit lacked
foundation and was scientifically weak).
[Vol. 62
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professional qualifications may not save an expert who lacks experience in the
subject industry, or who is unaware of current industry practices 9
The key issue when evaluating an expert's qualifications is whether he
intends to offer truly scientific testimony, or whether he intends to opine about
"technical" applications or industry practices. For example, is the expert a
medical doctor testifying about a causal link between chemical exposure and
cancer, or is he a career window washer who intends to testify about the safe use
of scaffolding or a bosun's seat? The former situation clearly calls for stricter
judicial scrutiny of the proposed expert's qualifications. As the Diviero v.
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co."0 court explained:
An expert's experience is given significant weight in determining the witness'
qualifications as an expert if only technical knowledge is required. If,
however, scientific knowledge is necessary the expertise must be coextensive
with the particular scientific discipline .... Expertise in the technology of
fruit is not sufficient when analyzing the science of apples 5
A trial court may not exclude expert testimony simply because the challenged
expert lacks the degree or training that the court believes most appropriate 2
Courts interpret Rule 702 liberally, which is troublesome when proposed
expert testimony is novel or controversial. For many years, courts encountering
unfamiliar expert testimony applied the test derived from Frye v. UnitedStates.
The Frye standard requires that the scientific principle or theory supporting the
subject expert testimony be "sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."' Frye essentially asks
courts to "count noses" to determine general acceptance.
Some courts began rejecting the Frye "general acceptance" standard
following the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.55 Rule 702
requires only that expert testimony assist the trier of fact; it does not mandate
general acceptance. Critics therefore argued that absent an express Frye
limitation in Rule 702, the general acceptance standard no longer existed. On
49. See, e.g., Meyerhoffv. Michelin Tire Corp., 70 F.3d 1175, 1182 (10th Cir.
1995) (engineer in products liability case).
50. 919 F. Supp. 1353 (D. Ariz. 1996), affid, 114 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 1997).
51. Id. at 1357 (citations omitted); accordThomas v. Newton Int'l Enters., 42 F.3d
1266, 1269-70 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between experts' qualifications
depending on whether intended testimony is scientific, or something other than
scientific).
52. Waldorfv. Shuta, 916 F. Supp. 423,430 (D.NJ. 1996) (citing In re Paoli R.R.
Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717,741 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1253 (1995)).
53. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
54. Id. at 1014.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1233-37 (3d Cir. 1985).
1997]
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the other hand, the general acceptance standard's proponents asserted that Rule
702's silence signalled Frye's incorporation. 6 In any event, Rule 702's failure
to specifically address Frye resulted in the general acceptance standard's
survival 7
The Supreme Court finally addressed the Frye general acceptance standard
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc."8 Summarizing the Court's
decision, Justice Blackmun wrote:
"General acceptance" is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of
scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of
Evidence-especially Rule 702-do assign to the trial judge the task of
ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is
relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
evidence will satisfy those demands59
The Court noted, however, that Frye's displacement by the Federal Rules of
Evidence:
[D]oes not mean... that the Rules themselves place no limits on the
admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial judge
disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the
trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.
Daubert makes clear that proposed scientific or expert testimony must be
supported by appropriate validation.6 For Rule 702 purposes, "evidentiary
reliability" means "trustworthiness." ' a Trial judges' screening of purportedly
56. See Douglas R. Richmond, Human Factors Experts in Personal Injury
Litigation, 46 ARK. L. REV. 333, 353-54 (1993).
57. See, e.g., Christopherson v. Allied Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115-16 (5th
Cir. 1991); Novak v. United States, 865 F.2d 718, 721 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 912 (1992); Kropinski v. World Plan Exec. Council-US, 853 F.2d 948, 956-57
(D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524,529 (1 lth Cir. 1996)
(observing that despite the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, "most courts
continued to adhere to the 'general acceptance' test"), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1243
(1997); McCullockv. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1042 (2d Cir. 1995) ('Until 1993,
the overwhelming majority of courts followed the so-called Frye test.... ").
58. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
59. Id at 597-98.
60. Id at 589.
61. Id at 590.
62. American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 135, 138 (6th Cir.
1995); Bradley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434,438 (7th.Cir. 1994).
[Vol. 62
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expert or scientific opinion now ensures the trustworthiness once guaranteed by
the Frye general acceptance standard.
The Daubert court identified four factors bearing on the trial court's
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying expert
testimony is scientifically valid. The first Daubert factor is whether the
scientific theory or technique at issue can be and has been tested. A scientific
explanation must be capable of empirical testP "Testability" is central to the
scientific method. Modem scientific methodology is based on testing hypotheses
to see if they can be falsified.6 Second, the scientific theory being advanced
must be subject to peer review. "Peer review" refers to scrutiny by the scientific
community. An expert's opinion based on information that cannot be
independently verified cannot be admissible because there is no guarantee "that
substantive flaws in [the expert's] methodology [have been] detected." 5
Conversely, scrutiny by the scientific community is a component of "good
science," because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws will be
uncovered' Although not dispositive, publication in a peer-reviewed journal
is a relevant consideration in assessing scientific validity. The third Daubert
factor the trial court must take into account is the known or potential rate of error
in any scientific technique, as well as the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique's operation.68 Both the rate of error and controlling
standards affect evidentiary reliability. Finally, "general acceptance" can yet
bear on the admissibility of expert testimony. Widespread professional
acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible.
On the other hand, a known technique that has attracted only minimal support
within the related scientific community may properly be viewed with
skepticism 9
The Daubert inquiry extends beyond an examination of the reliability of the
challenged scientific theories or methodology in the abstrac 70 "In order to
determine whether scientific testimony is reliable, the [trial] court must conclude
that the testimony was derived from the application of a reliable methodology
or principle in the particular case."7' Scientists, no matter how reputable, are not
63. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (quoting C.







70. United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1062 (1994).
71. Id. at 1198.
19971
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permitted to base their testimony on work undertaken or methods specially
employed in anticipation of litigation 2 Experts' opinions must be based on
methods generally employed in their normal academic or professional
endeavors.O Where experts' findings flow from their own research or regular
research activities, as compared to work performed at litigants' direction or
request, their testimony is less likely to be influenced or biased by promised
compensation 4 Determining whether a method, technique, or theory constitutes
the "good science" necessary to make related expert testimony admissible
therefore demands case-specific scrutiny.
In Joiner v. General Electric Co.,.75 plaintiff Robert Joiner and his wife
alleged that Mr. Joiner developed lung cancer as a result of exposure to
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Joiner claimed that while his history of
cigarette smoking and his family's history of lung cancer may have predisposed
him to developing lung cancer, his exposure to PCBs and their derivatives
(furans and dioxins) promoted the development of his cancer 6 The district
court deemed inadmissible all of the plaintiffs' experts' testimony that Joiner's
exposure to PCBs, furans, and dioxins caused his cancer. The district court then
entered summary judgment in the defendants' favor, from which the plaintiffs
appealed.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied Daubert to the plaintiffs'
claims. The Joiner court first determined that the plaintiffs' experts'
methodology, procedures, and information supporting their opinions were
scientifically reliable.78 The plaintiffs' two chief experts were Dr. Daniel
Teitelbaum, a clinical toxicologist, and Dr. Arnold Schecter, a preventative
medicine specialist. Both doctors were eminently qualified; indeed, they
appeared to enjoy good national reputations29 Both experts familiarized
themselves with the specifics of Joiner's health history and disease, and both
reviewed pertinent medical literature. 0 Dr. Teitelbaum examined Joiner,
interviewed him and reviewed his medical records, and reviewed the depositions
72. Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. granted in
part, 117 S. Ct. 941 (1997). Similarly, an expert's cross-examination in other cases
about his theories or methodology is not a substitute for peer review. See Peitzmeier v.
Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1592
(1997).
73. Kahn, 93 F.3d at 1365.
74. Jones v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 894, 897 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
75. 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1243 (1997).
76. Id. at 528.
77. Id. at 528-29.
78. Id. at 530-31.
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of Joiner's family and his coworkers."' Dr. Schecter interviewed Joiner and
reviewed his medical records, as well as viewing avideotape of Joiner's working
conditions related to his alleged toxic exposure8 2 Each doctor utilized
"numerous scientific studies and authorities" in arriving at his respective
opinions.'
Likewise, Drs. Teitelbaum and Schecter each utilized scientifically reliable
methods and procedures in gathering and assimilating all of the information
forming their opinions." Each doctor asserted that the procedures he employed
in arriving at his opinions were generally accepted in the medical community,
a point that the defendants did not dispute.85 The doctors' extensive experience
in their respective fields further augmented the reliability of their methodology
and reasoning.86
The Joiner court especially criticized the trial court's review of the bases
for Drs. Teitelbaum's and Schecter's opinions in its quest to determine scientific
reliability." For example, the district court rejected the plaintiffs' experts' two
animal studies because of their limited number, because they used massive doses
of PCBs, and because they were conducted on animals instead of humans. 8
None of these reasons were sufficient to render the experts' testimony unreliable.
The question is whether the expert's use of challenged studies represents sound
methodology. 9 The number of studies is irrelevant and it is improper to deem
research unreliable solely because it employs animal subjects.'
"As Daubert makes clear," the Joiner court observed, a district court "may
not decide whether an expert's opinions are correct, but merely whether the
bases supporting the conclusions are reliable."9' Instead of reviewing the bases
for the experts' opinions to screen out mere speculation, the district court
excluded the experts' testimony because it drew different conclusions from their
research 2 This it should not have done. Courts should simply satisfy
themselves as to the reliability of proffered expert testimony, "leaving the jury







87. See id. at 532-33.
88. Id. at 532.
89. Id.
90. Id.





Richmond: Richmond: Regulating Expert Testimony
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
MISOUR'LA4WREVIEW
While the Joiner court never expressly so stated, it appears from the opinion
that it concluded that the plaintiffs' experts' testimony satisfied the first three
Daubert prongs: (1) "testability"; (2) peer review of the methodology or
reasoning; and (3) the known or potential rate of error in the scientific technique.
The fourth Daubert factor-general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community-was conceded by the defendants.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals applied Daubert in another PCB
exposure case, In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation.4  The Paoli
defendants challenged the methodologies used by the plaintiffs' two expert
physicians, and particularly challenged the experts' differential diagnoses. 9
Differential diagnosis involves the testing of a falsifiable hypothesis (e.g., PCBs
cause cancer) by attempting to rule out alternative causes.'
The Paoli court focused on the standards controlling the experts'
differential diagnoses. Given the special problems attending doctors' differential
diagnoses, the Paoli court noted that it had to be flexible in conducting its
Daubert inquiry. The key factor was the doctors' use of standard diagnostic
techniques in gathering medical information. The more standard the technique
a practice, the more likely a court is to find that the challenged methodology is
reliableY
The court concluded that the district court could only exclude the experts'
testimony under Rule 702 if either (1) the experts engaged in very few standard
diagnostic techniques by which doctors normally rule out alternative causes and
offered no good explanation for why their conclusions remained reliable; or (2)
the defendants pointed to some likely cause of injuries other than PCB exposure
and the plaintiffs' experts offered no reasonable explanation as to why they
believed the defendants' actions were a substantial factor in the particular
plaintiff's illness.9" The Paoli court specifically noted that physicians who
evaluate patients in preparation for litigation "should seek more than a patient's
self-report of symptoms or illness and hence should either examine the patient
or review the patient's medical records" in order to render an expert opinion. 9
Where the plaintiffs' experts based their conclusions solely on plaintiffs' self-
reports of illness or symptoms, the district court properly excluded their
testimony as being unreliable." °
94. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
95. Id. at 752-71.
96. Id. at 758.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 760.
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Daubert spawned a number of decisions involving scientific evidence. 10'
The Tenth Circuit has generously interpreted Daubert to support the admission
of expert testimony." z  The District of Columbia,0 3 Second,'0 Fourth,O5
101. State courts also have been called upon to review the admissibility of
scientific evidence and to consider Daubert's application. Several states have apparently
adopted Daubert without doing so expressly. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 628 A2d 69,73-
74 (Del. 1993); Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1250 n.12, 1251 n.15 (Ind. 1995);
Hutchison v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 885-88 (Iowa 1994);
Nelson v. American Sterilizer Co., No. 199685, 1997 WL 265030 (Mich. Ct. App. May
16, 1997); State v. Brooks, 643 A.2d 226, 229 (Vt. 1993). The Supreme Court of
Arkansas expressed its approval of Daubert in Jones v. State, 862 S.W.2d 242 (Ark.
1993), but found its application unnecessary in the case at bar. Id. at 244-45.
Massachusetts adopted Daubert in Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (Mass.
1994), while labeling "general acceptance" the most significant issue in the analysis of
scientific evidence. Id at 1349. Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, South
Dakota, Texas and West Virginia have all adopted Daubert. See Mitchell v.
Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100,101 (Ky. 1995); State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1121-
23 (La. 1993); State v. Moore, 885 P.2d 457,471 (Mont. 1994); State v. Alberico, 861
P.2d 192,202-04 (N.M. 1993); State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482,484 (S.D. 1994); E.I.
du Pont deNemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 554-60 (Tex. 1995); State v.
Beard, 461 S.E.2d 486,491-93 (W. Va. 1995); Wilt v. Buracker, 443 SX..2d 196,200-03
(W. Va. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2137 (1994).
Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New York and Washington continue to adhere to the Frye general acceptance test. See
Mattox v. State, 875 P.2d 763, 764-65 (Alaska 1994); State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152,
1181-83 (Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1046 (1994); People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d
321, 324-31 (Cal. 1994); Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 829 n.2 (Fla. 1993); State
v. Hill, 895 P.2d 1238, 1245-47 (Kan. 1995); United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 647 A.2d 405, 423 (Md. 1994); State v. Carter, 524 N.W.2d 763, 777-79
(Neb. 1994); State v. Vandebogart, 652 A.2d 671, 677-78 (N.H. 1994); People v.
Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451,453-55 (N.Y. 1994); State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43,48 n.1 (Wash.
1994). Colorado apparently adheres to Frye. See Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 888-
91 (Colo. 1993) (reiterating support for Frye and applying the general acceptance
standard to DNA evidence). A word of caution: Fishback was decided two months
before the Supreme Court decided Daubert.
Daubert's application is an open question in many states. See, e.g., City of Fargo
v. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d 700, 705 n.2 (N.D. 1994) (mentioning both Frye and
Daubert, but applying no discernable standard). The Supreme Court of Connecticut
observed in State v. All, 660 A.2d 337, 350 n.15 (Conn. 1995), that it was not being
called upon to evaluate its Frye standard in light of Daubert, and thus it did not. The
Supreme Court of Missouri declined to address Dauber! and the Missouri equivalent of
Rule 702 in Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital, 863 S.W.2d 852, 860 (Mo. 1993).
The Supreme Court of Minnesota skirted Daubert in State v. Hodgson, 512 N.W.2d 95,
98 (Minn. 1994).
102. See, e.g., Robinson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 16 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 1994)
19971
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Fifth,1 6 Sixth, 0 Eighth, °'0 and Ninth Circuits"° have all liberally admitted
scientific evidence following Daubert.
A number of federal courts have excluded or rejected expert testimony since
Daubert.110
(video animation ofhypothetical car-train collision); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d
1332 (10th Cir.) (permissible for police officer to testify that amount of cocaine
defendant possessed reflected intent to distribute the drug), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 862
(1994).
103. See, e.g., Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (medical
testimony concerning causal link between prescription drug Depo-Provera and birth
defects), cert. deniedsub nom. Upjohn Co. v. Ambrosini, 117 S. Ct. 1572 (1997).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 58 (2d Cir. 1993) (DEA
agent's testimony about methods of drug operations and money laundering).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 3 F.3d 769, 772-73 (4th Cir. 1993)
(chromatograph analysis of cocaine).
106. See, e.g., Carroll v. Morgan, 17 F.3d 787, 789-90 (5th Cir. 1994); see also
United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 379-80 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting defendant's
claim that scientific test was not generally accepted without relying on Daubert).
107. See, e.g., Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1012-14 (6th Cir. 1993)(medical testimony-asbestos exposure); United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 549-66
(6th Cir. 1993) (DNA tests).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 32 F.3d 395, 400 (8th Cir. 1994) (DEA
agent allowed to testify that entries in notebook were consistent with records of drug
transactions); United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1195-99 (8th Cir. 1993) (DNA
profiling), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1062 (1994).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Alonso, 48 F.3d 1536, 1539-40 (9th Cir. 1995)
(police officers allowed to testify that criminal suspect attempted to avoid or detect
surveillance); Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1123-25 (9th Cir. 1994)
(medical testimony that silicone breast implants caused plaintiff's autoimmune disease),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1082 (1995); United States v. Quinn, 18 F.3d 1461, 1464-65 (9th
Cir. 1994) (photogrammetry evidence used to determine suspect's height from
surveillance photographs), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1242 (1994).
110. See, e.g., Raynor v. Merrell Pharm., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(plaintiffs' experts not permitted to link drug Bendectin to birth defects); Bogosian v.
Mercedes-Benz, Inc., 104 F.3d 472,477-79 (1st Cir. 1997) (certified master mechanic
not allowed to testify about automobile transmission design defect); Smelser v. Norfolk
S. Ry., 105 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 1997) (biomechanics expert should not have been allowed
to testify about shoulder belt failure); Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 F.3d 508, 512-14
(7th Cir. 1997) (toxicologist not permitted to testify about effect of in utero bromide
exposure); Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 195-98 (5th Cir. 1996)(toxicologists not allowed to testify about alleged link between ethylene oxide exposure
and brain cancer); Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir. 1996)(ecologist not allowed to testify about harm to humans from chemical exposure based on
study using.rats); Braun v. Lorillard, Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 233-35 (7th Cir. 1996)(biochemist in asbestosis case); Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 296-98
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(8th Cir. 1996) (engineering expert in products liability case involving tire changing
machine), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997); Wright v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 91
F.3d 1105, 1107-08 (8th Cir. 1996) (industrial hygienist and pharmacologist in toxic tort
case); Lust v. Merrell Dow Phann., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 596-98 (9th Cir. 1996) (birth
defect allegedly attributable to fertility drug); United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809, 813-
15 (4th Cir.) (forensic anthropologists who reviewed surveillance videotape), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. (1995); American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 45 F.3d
135, 137-39 (6th Cir. 1995) (electrical engineering testimony in wiring short circuit
case); Gier v. Educational Serv. Unit No. 16, 66 F.3d 940, 942-44 (8th Cir. 1995)
(psychological evaluations in child sexual abuse case); Pestel v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 64
F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1995) (mechanical engineer-products liability action); Watkins v.
Schriver, 52 F.3d 769,771-72 (8th Cir.1995) (medical testimony-mechanics of injury);
United States v. Rice, 52 F.3d 843, 846-47 (10th Cir. 1995) (testimony by former tax
prosecutor that government should not have filed criminal tax case), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 2536 (1996); Bammerlin v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 30 F.3d 898,901-902 (7th
Cir. 1994) (testimony on meaning and applicability of safety standards); O'Conner v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1105-07 (7th Cir.) (medical
testimony-radiation exposure), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1222 (1994); Pries v. Honda
Motor Co., 31 F.3d 543, 545 (7th Cir. 1994) (biomechanics expert testifying about
experiment on car door latch); Sorensen v. Shaldee Corp., 31 F.3d 638, 645-51 (8th Cir.
1994) (drug products liability action-medical testimony by clinical toxicologist,
geneticist and epidemiologist); Claarv. Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499,501-02 (9th Cir.
1994) (medical testimony-workplace chemical exposure); Rogers v. Ford Motor Co.,
952 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (plaintiffs' expert engineer not allowed to testify
about alleged seat belt failure); Cuevas v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 956 F. Supp.
1306, 1308-13 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (barring toxicology testimony by treating physicians);
Reiff v. Convergent Techs., 957 F. Supp. 573, 577-83 (D.N.J. 1997) (excluding
engineer's testimony in keyboard carpal tunnel case); Kelley v. American Heyer-Schulte
Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (excluding epidemiologist's and
rheumatologist's testimony in breast implant case); Carmichael v. Samiyag Tires, Inc.,
923 F. Supp. 1514, 1520-21 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (mechanical engineer in tire failure case);
Diviero v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 919 F. Supp. 1353, 1358-60 (D. Ariz. 1996)
(engineer in tire failure case), af'd, 114 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 1997); Sanderson v.
International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (doctors not
allowed to testify on toxic effect of aldehydes in fragrances); Jones v. United States, 933
F. Supp. 894, 897-901 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (doctor and pharmacist not allowed to testify
about drug interaction); Meyers v. Arcudi, 947 F. Supp. 581, 586-88 (D. Conn. 1996)
(refusing to admit polygraph evidence in a sexual harassment case); Cartwright v. Home
Depot U.S.A., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 900, 905-07 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (physicians attempting
to testify about asthma resulting from latex paint exposure); Haggerty v. Upjohn Co., 950
F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (pharmacologist not allowed to testify that Halcion
caused undesirable psychiatric and behavioral effects); Everett v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
949 F. Supp. 856, 858-59 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (doctor could not link plaintiff's health
problems to chemical exposure); Dukes v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 934 F. Supp. 939, 945-53(N.D. I11. 1996) (neurosurgeon attempting to testify about cause of railroad worker's
carpal tunnel syndrome); Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Indus., Ltd., 925 F. Supp. 1323, 1328-
19971
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29(N.D. 11. 1996) (engineering testimony in product liability case); Zarecki v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., 914 F. Supp. 1566, 1573-74 (N.D. 111. 1996) (treating physician
in keyboard carpal tunnel case); Stibbs v. MAPCO, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1220, 1222-25
(S.D. Iowa 1996) (engineers' attempted use of "differential diagnosis" in explaining LP
gas/hot water heater explosion); Miller v. Heaven, 922 F. Supp. 495, 500-04 (D. Kan.
1996) (polygraph evidence); Rice v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Pac. Ry., 920 F. Supp.
732, 736-38 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (trainmen in FELA case); Stalnaker v. General Motors
Corp., 934 F. Supp. 179, 181 (D. Md. 1996) (expert testimony concerning seat belt latch
in automobile products liability case); Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 945 F. Supp. 209, 211-14
(D. Nev. 1996) (medical testimony in products liability case involving brain shunt);
Tassin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 946 F. Supp. 1241, 1244-52 (M.D. La. 1996)
(engineer's alternative designs in product liability case); Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor
Alkali Co., 921 F. Supp. 666, 669-72, 673-78 (D. Nev. 1996) (medical testimony in
chlorine exposure case); Rutigliano v. Valley Bus. Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 783-86
(D.NJ. 1996) (occupational physician testifying about formaldehyde exposure); Dennis
v. Pertec Computer Corp., 927 F. Supp. 156, 158-62 (D.N.J. 1996) (ergonomist and
industrial engineer in repetitive motion case); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F.
Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996) (medical experts attempting to link silicone breast implants and
various ailments); In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. 11, 911 F. Supp. 775, 786-810, 824-26
(M.D. Pa. 1996) (various scientists in case involving alleged exposure to radioactive
gases from a nuclear reactor); Bennett v. PRC Pub. Sector, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 484,488-
502 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Ballinger v. Atkins, 947 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Va. 1996) (biochemist
and internist not allowed to testify about alleged causal link between aspartame and
plaintiff's neurological and physical ailments); City ofTuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems.,
Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504, 1512-32 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (economic testimony in antitrust
case); Casey v. Ohio Med. Prods., 877 F. Supp. 1380, 1383-86 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (expert
medical testimony concerning causal link between halothane exposure and liver disease);
Ayers v. Robinson, 887 F. Supp. 1049, 1058-64 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (economist-hedonic
damages); Schmaltz v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 878 F. Supp. 1119, 1120-24 (N.D. Il. 1995)
(herbicide exposure allegedly causing reactive airway dysfunction syndrome); Tucker v.
Nike, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 1192, 1195-98 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (podiatrist in case in which
athletic shoe allegedly contributed to cause of achilles tendon injury); In re Aluminum
Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Kan. 1995) (economist's attempted use
of "before and after" model to establish antitrust damages); Textron, Inc. v. Barber-
Colman Co., 903 F. Supp. 1558, 1568-69 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (CERCLA case-hazardous
waste contamination); Grimes v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 33, 35-38
(D.N.H. 1995) (ophthalmologist evaluating photochemical effects on eye); Summers v.
Missouri Pac. R.R. Sys., 897 F. Supp. 533, 541-42 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (clinical
ecology/multiple chemical hypersensitivity syndrome); Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F.
Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1995) (alleged causal link between aviation jet fuel vapor and
various chronic illnesses), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 100 F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th Cir.
1996) (affirming district court's exclusion of expert testimony); In re Hanford Nuclear
Reservation Litig., 894 F. Supp. 1436, 1446-49 (E.D. Wash. 1995) (fisheries biology);
Goomar v. Centennial Life Ins. Co., 855 F. Supp. 319, 326 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (medical
testimony as to claimed psychotic condition), aftd, 76 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1996); Byrnes
v. Honda Motor Co., 887 F. Supp. 279, 281-82 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (motorcycle design
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Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,' is among the more interesting cases
because the court's decision was unaffected by Daubert. In Joy, the District of
Columbia Circuit ruled that the district court erred in admitting expert economic
testimony on the plaintiff's future earning capacity.112 The Joy court concluded
that the district court erred because the expert's testimony was based solely on
"guesswork, speculation, and conjecture.""1 3 Daubert played no role in the
court's decision because Rule 702 permits expert testimony only when scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact As "'the
word 'knowledge' connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation,"' the expert economist's testimony did not meet the Rule 702
standard.14
The plaintiff in Cummins v. Lyle Industries"5 sued the manufacturer of an
industrial trim press in which she lost three fingers. The defendant moved to
preclude the testimony of one of the plaintiffs experts, Dr. Thomas Carpenter.
Dr. Carpenter was prepared to testify as to the feasibility of several alternative
designs for the braking system on the trim press, and to the adequacy of
warnings."6 The district court limited Dr.Carpenter's testimony and, aflter the
defendant prevailed at trial, the plaintiff appealed.117
The Cwnmins court first examined whether Dr. Carpenter's intended expert
testimony constituted scientific knowledge.' With respect to the first Daubert
factor-whether the proffered opinion has been subjected to the scientific
method--Dr. Carpenter's testimony clearly came up short. The Cummins court
was not satisfied by Dr. Carpenter's explanation that the alternative parts that he
believed should be incorporated into the trim press were "off-the-shelf'
components, and that other electrical circuits in the machine already incorporated
the time-delay relay that he argued should have been employed in the function
defect case); Dana Corp. v. American Standard,Inc., 866 F. Supp. 1481, 1498-1503 (N.D.
Ind. 1994) (CERCLA case-hazardous waste disposal); Sullivan v. United States
Gypsum Co., 862 F. Supp. 317, 321 (D. Kan. 1994) (economic testimony--hedonic
damages); Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1382, 1391-99 (W.D. Mo.
1994) (hydrogeological testimony in groundwater pollution case); Hein v. Merck & Co.,
868 F. Supp. 230,232-35 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (economic testimony-4edonic damages);
Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441 (D.V.l.) (drug product
liability-birth defects), aff'd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994).
111. 999 F.2d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
112. Id at568-69.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 570 (quoting Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th
Cir. 1995)).
115. 93 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1996).
116. Id. at 365.
117. Id. at 366.
118. See id. at 368.
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at issue." 9 Because Dr. Carpenter conducted no testing to substantiate his
opinions, his testimony "could not fairly be characterized as scientific
knowledge."'1'2 This was especially true given the fact that Dr. Carpenter's
opinions "clearly [lent] themselves to testing and substantiation by the scientific
method.1' 2'
Dr. Carpenter's testimony was further undermined by his lack of scientific
background investigation. Dr. Carpenter acknowledged that he read no studies,
surveys, or analyses regarding the design, manufacture, or use of industrial trim
presses." With respect to the adequacy of the manufacturer's warnings, Dr.
Carpenter at least read texts discussing warnings; however, he did not know
what warnings would have been effective in the absence of testing. 13
The Cummins court also found that Dr. Carpenter's intended testimony
fled the Daubert test because his theories were never exposed to peer review.
Dr. Carpenter never published an article or study concerning the incorporation
of alternative design features in machinery such as the trim press at issue. 24
The district court had no occasion to address the third Daubert factor, i.e.,
whether the expert testimony has been evaluated in light of the potential rate of
error in the scientific technique."z It was clear from the circumstances, however,
that Dr. Carpenter's testimony could not be evaluated in light of any potential
rate of error. The complete lack of testing precluded such scrutiny. Dr.
Carpenter's intended testimony thus had to fail Daubert's third prong. Dr.
Carpenter's failure to test his proposed design alternatives violated or failed the
accepted method for gathering and evaluating data in design defect cases.126
The Cummins court thus concluded that the district court properly adhered
to the methodology established in Daubert. The district court "carefully
performed its gate keeping function under Rule 702.'" 27 Accordingly, it did not
abuse its discretion by precluding Dr. Carpenter's expert testimony on alternative
designs and the adequacy of warnings. 28
Other courts have reached similar results. For example, the American &
Foreign Insurance Co. v. General Electric Co. '2 court affirmed a district court's
determination that the plaintiff's electrical engineering expert could not satisfy
119. Id.
120. Id. at 369.
121. Id.






128. Id. at 371.
129. 45 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1995).
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at least two ofDaubert s four prongs.3 0 The expert's theories were not accepted
by other experts in the same field, and his testing and his theory were not of a
type reasonably relied upon by others in his field.' Moreover, his testing was
woefully inadequate. He did not preserve the raw data from his tests and he
never calibrated the instruments used to perform those tests.32
In Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick,'33 the district court's decision
to admit expert accounting testimony was at issue. The plaintiff's chief witness
was her expert accountant, who testified to the market value of her investments
over the defendant's objection.'34 The district court did not conduct the
preliminary assessment of the expert's reasoning or methodology that Daubert
requires before allowing him to testify. 3 ' The expert admitted on cross-
examination that his valuations were not market values, but were only a fairly
simple pass at determining the magnitude of the problems the plaintiff alleged.
The expert further admitted that, in reaching his opinions, he did not employ
methodology that valuation experts find essential.'36
The Frymire-Brinati court held that the district court erred by allowing the
expert to testify. The district court should have assessed the expert's reasoning
and methodology before admitting his testimony. Had the district court
performed its Daubert function, it could not properly have admitted the expert's
valuation under Rule 702.1
Daubert also requires "scientific fit." In other words, expert testimony must
advance a material aspect of the proposing party's case.3 8 "Scientific fit"
problems arise independently of expert qualification issues or deficiencies in
experts' scientific knowledge or methodology, although the distinction between
"scientific validity" and "scientific fit" is not always clear. Essentially, Rule
702's helpfulness standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent
inquiry in the case as a precondition to admissibility. 9 The pertinent inquiry is
often causation." If an expert cannot state a causal connection in terms of
130. Id. at 140.
131. Id. at 139.
132. Id.
133. 2 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1993).
134. Id. at 186.
135. Id. at 187.
136. Id. at 186.
137. Id. at 187.
138. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phann., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,591 (1993).
139. Id. at 591-92.
140. See, e.g., Smelserv.Norfolk S. Ry., 105 F.3d 299,305 (6th Cir. 1997); Rosen
v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316,318-19 (7th Cir. 1996); Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 89 F.3d 594,596-98 (9th Cir. 1996); Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc.,
58 F.3d 341, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1995); Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 24 F.3d 809, 812-
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certainty or probability, the expert's testimony must be excluded. The Ninth
Circuit's recent Daubert decision following the Supreme Court's remand
illustrates the consequences of a bad scientific fit. 4'
Daubert involved claims of limb reduction birth defects attributable to the
prescription drug Bendectin. Between 1957 and 1982, some 17.5 million
pregnant women took Bendectin to combat morning sickness. The Daubert
court applied California substantive law, which required statistical proof that the
ingestion of Bendectin more than doubled the likelihood of the plaintiffs' birth
defects in order to establish causation."' The plaintiffs' experts could testify
only that Bendectin was "'capable of causing' birth defects."'" Because the
plaintiffs' experts could not quantify this mere possibility or weigh their
conclusions about causation without changing their conclusions altogether, they
could not show that their findings were derived by scientific method. 44 As a
result, their intended testimony was not a good scientific "fit" and was
inadmissible.
In Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,"1 the plaintiff suffered a heart attack several
days after he began using a nicotine patch in an attempt to quit smoking. The
plaintiff continued to smoke as he wore the patch and he had a history of
14 (6th Cir. 1994); O'Connerv. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1105-07 (7th
Cir. 1994); Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 614-16 (7th Cir. 1993); Reiffv.
Convergent Techs., 957 F. Supp. 573 (D.N.J. 1997); Kelley v. American Heyer-Schulte
Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Tex. 1997); Sanderson v. International Flavors &
Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 998-1000 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Jones v. United States,
933 F. Supp. 894, 900-01 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Haggerty v. Upjohn Co., 950 F. Supp. 1160,
1163-67 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Dukes v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 934 F. Supp. 939, 945-53 (N.D.
Il1. 1996); Stibbs v. MAPCO, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1220, 1222-25 (S.D. Iowa 1996);
Rutigliano v. Valley Bus. Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779,783-91 (D.N.J. 1996); Hall v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996); Ballinger v. Atkins, 947 F. Supp.
925,928-29 (E.D. Va. 1996); Casey v. Ohio Med. Prods., 877 F. Supp. 1380, 1383-86
(N.D. Cal. 1995); Reynard v. NEC Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1500, 1904-08 (M.D. Fla. 1995);
Tucker v. Nike, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 1192, 1196-98 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Pomella v. Regency
Coach Lines, Ltd., 899 F. Supp. 335,341-43 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Grimes v. Hoffman-
LaRoche, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 33,37-38 (D.N.H. 1995); Goewey v. United States, 886
F. Supp. 1268, 1279-83 (D.S.C. 1995); Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 763-73
(E.D. Va. 1995), aff'd inpart, rev'd in part, 100 F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th Cir. 1996)
(affirming exclusion of expert testimony).
For a case in which a court ruled that expert testimony would not meet the
plaintiff's causation burden without relying on Daubert, see Sakaria v. Trans World
Airlines, 8 F.3d 164, 171-73 (4th Cir. 1993).
141. Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
142. Id. at 1320.
143. Id. at 1321.
144. Id. at 1322.
145. 78 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1996).
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coronary artery disease, high blood pressure, coronary bypass surgery, and heavy
smoking.1'4 The plaintiff offered the deposition testimony of Dr. Harry Fozzard,
a distinguished cardiologist, to establish a causal link between his use of the
nicotine patch and his heart attack. 47 The district court held that Dr. Fozzard's
testimony was inadmissible and, without it, the plaintiff could not survive
summary judgment. 48 The plaintiff then appealed.
The Rosen court easily accepted the district court's determination that "Dr.
Fozzard's testimony was not real science."' 49 Dr. Fozzard expressed nothing
more than an insightful hunch." Nowhere did Dr. Fozzard rule out other causes
for the plaintiff's heart attack, nor did he distinguish between the nicotine patch
and other contributing factors."' Dr. Fozzard never explained how a nicotine
overdose could cause a heart attack, which he should have considered given the
plaintiff's continued smoking, and he could point to no medical or scientific
literature supporting his theory.' 2 While the court was willing to carefully
consider Dr. Fozzard's opinions based on his professional preeminence, it could
not endorse his testimony. "IT]he courtroom is not the place for scientific
guesswork, even of the inspired sort. Law lags science; it does not lead it. There
may be evidence to back up [Dr.] Fozzard's claim, but none was presented to the
district court.' 5 3
Daubert's effect and meaning have been the topic of considerable debate.
Daubert did not "work a sea of change over federal evidence law."" 4 Courts
have not analytically shifted very far from where they were before. The Rule
702 standard remains flexible. 55 There is some question as to whether Daubert
should be applied only to novel scientific testimony, or whether it is appropriate
for all kinds of expert testimony.56 And, as noted previously,157 expert
146. Id. at 317.
147. Id. at 318.
148. Id.
149. Id.




154. United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996); see
also Compton v. Subaru, Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1519 (10th Cir. 1996) (Daubert does not
completely change courts' "traditional analysis under Rule 702. Instead, Daubert sets
out additional factors the trial court should consider under Rule 702 if an expert witness
offers testimony based upon a particular methodology or technique."); United States v.
Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Daubert does not create a special analysis
for answering questions about the admissibility of all expert testimony.").
155. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,594 (1993).
156. Compare Thorntonv. Caterpillar, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 575, 577 (D.S.C. 1997)
(holding that the Daubert analysis is limited to scientific evidence; it does not apply to
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testimony requires case-specific scrutiny; scientific reasoning and methodology
defy rigid analysis. Daubert's worth thus lies in its formulation of general Rule
702 standards, and the Supreme Court's call to trial courts to fulfill their role as
evidentiary gatekeepers. Courts can no longer admit questionable expert
testimony anticipating thatjuries will afford it appropriate weight15 8
Daubert's continuing meaning is uncertain. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Joiner v. General Electric Co.," 9 ostensibly to decide the appellate
review standard to be applied to a trial court's decision to exclude expert
testimony.'10 But some evidence scholars suggest that implicit in the Court's
decision to take the case is its desire to more exactly explain trial courts'
"gatekeeping" function." If those scholars are right, federal evidence law
relating to expert witnesses may change yet again. If it does, radical change
seems very unlikely. Under no circumstances should the Court retreat from
Daubert, for it has had the beneficial effect of barring a great deal of suspect
"science" from courtrooms.
C. Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705
Another important issue is the acceptable foundation for expert testimony.
Prior to the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, expert witnesses based
their opinions on facts either known from personal observation or provided by
the sponsoring party, usually at trial by way of hypothetical questions. Rule 703
incorporated these traditional bases, but it also added a third category:
expert testimony that is technical in nature, or that covers specialized knowledge), with
Rogers v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F. Supp. 606, 613 n.5 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (stating that
Daubert analysis "is appropriate for all kinds of expert testimony').
157. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
158. While Daubert emphasizes the importance of a pretrial procedure by which
the trial judge scrutinizes challenged expert testimony, a party opposing scientific
evidence under Daubert must still object to its introduction at trial. Even expert
testimony that is questionable under Daubert and thus Rule 702 will be admitted if the
opposing party fNils to contemporaneously object. See, e.g., Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt,
83 F.3d 1060, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1996) (defendant also failed to insist that district court
rule on pre-trial Daubert challenge); McKnightv. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396,
1406-07 (8th Cir. 1994). In addition to specifically objecting under Rule 702 (and likely
Rules 703 and 403), counsel must be sure to object on relevancy grounds, for evidence
that is inadmissible under Rule 702 is surely irrelevant.
159. 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. CL 1243 (1997). See also
discussion of Joiner supra notes 75-93 and accompanying text.
160. See Marcia Coyle, Cert. Granted in Expert Witness Case, NAT'L L.J., Mar.
31, 1997, atBi, B1.
161. See id
162. See, e.g., United States v. Crabtree, 979 F.2d 1261, 1270 (7th Cir. 1992)
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The ftts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible in evidence.63
Experts now are permitted to rely on any facts or data "reasonably relied upon"
by other professionals in their field.
Rule 705 is Rule 703's foundational cousin. Rule 705 provides: "The
expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefore
without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying
facts or data on cross-examination."'" Rule 705 allows expert witnesses to
present "naked opinions."'" The opposing party then bears the burden of
exploring the expert's assumptions and the foundation for the expert's opinions
on cross-examination." If cross-examination reveals that the testimony rests on
inadequate foundation, the trial court may strike the expert's testimony.' 67
Rule 705 does not excuse parties from qualifying witnesses as experts.
Parties must establish expert witnesses' qualifications under Rule 702 before
eliciting naked opinions. A trial judge retains the right under Rule 705 to insist
that he be given the underlying facts or data for an expert's opinion by way of
proffer in order to make a threshold determination of admissibility." s Finally,
advocates must remember that Rule 705 is designed for trial, where experts can
be cross-examined. The rule cannot be used to excuse conclusory expert
affidavits submitted in an effort to avoid summary judgment.'6
Rules 703 and 705 eliminate the time-consuming process of introducing
into evidence the mass of material that commonly forms the basis of an expert's
(holding that Rule 703 permitted expert to base his opinion on facts and data learned by
attending trial and listening to testimony).
163. FED.R.EvD. 703.
164. FED. R. EviD. 705.
165. Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333,1339 (7th
Cir. 1989).
166. See Toucetv. Maritime Overseas Corp., 991 F.2d 5,10 (1st Cir. 1993); United
States v. Whitetail, 956 F.2d 857, 861-62 (8th Cir. 1992); Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Opticon,
Inc., 935 F.2d 1569,1575 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 793
(loth Cir. 1980).
167. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1183 (1st Cir. 1993).
168. United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274,278 (Ist Cir. 1995).
169. Hayes v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 8 F.3d 88,92 (1st Cir. 1993); see M & M
Med. Supplies & Ser., Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp., 981 F.2d 160, 165 (4th Cir. 1992).
But see Monks v. General Elec. Co., 919 F.2d 1189, 1192 (6th Cir. 1990).
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opinion.' 0 Rules 703 and 705 do not afford proposed expert testimony
automatic admissibility, however, as University of Rhode Island v. A. W.
Chesterton Co. 171 demonstrates.
A. W. Chesterton involved corrosion damage to a University of Rhode Island
(URI) research vessel, the Endeavor. URI sued the A.W. Chesterton Company,
whose product allegedly failed to remedy the corrosion. At trial, URI called as
an expert witness its comptroller, Ronald Osborne, to establish the amount of
money it spent to correct the Endeavor's corrosion problem allegedly left
unremedied by the defendant's system. Osborne, a certified public accountant,
directed all URI financial information and accounting practices. URI proffered
no other evidence on damages. 72
The defendant objected to Osborne's testimony before he could state an
opinion. The defendant contended that Osborne was not a qualified expert on
damage calculations, that the factual bases for his intended testimony included
inadmissible hearsay, and that his calculations included inappropriate factors,
such as indirect research costs." The trial court sustained the defendant's
objection because URI did not establish that the facts on which Osborne relied
were reasonably relied upon by experts in damages assessment 7 4
On appeal, URI argued that Rules 703 and 705 afford the right to present
unsubstantiated expert testimony on direct examination without first disclosing
its factual underpinnings."v TheA.W. Chesterton court had no doubt that Rules
703 and 705 permitted the district court to admit Osborne's opinion testimony,
but concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the
evidence.1 76 At a minimum, Rules 703 and 705 suggest that a proponent of
expert testimony be prepared to make a limited offer of proof to aid the trial
court in determining admissibility if required.1"
Even though URI's threshold burden was minimal, and may have been readily
met, it made no attempt whatever to assuage the district court's legitimate
concerns, but chose instead to rely on its perceived "right" to have Osborne's
opinion admitted under Rule 703. Apparently, URI came to trial with no
supporting documentation whatever to substantiate Osborne's assessment of
damages. Based on what can be gleaned from Osborne's preliminary
testimony, URI's apparent unpreparedness and recalcitrance may have given
170. Mendes-Silva v. United States, 980 F.2d 1482, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(discussing Rule 703); Symbol Technologies, 935 F.2d at 1576 (discussing Rule 705).
171. 2 F.3d 1200 (Ist Cir. 1993).
172. Id. at 1217.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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the district court real concerns as to Osborne's methodology... Osborne's
"damages" assessment was not based solely on the conventional examination
and compilation of documents from which an expert objectively might
ascertain the overtime labor costs incurred in repairing Endeavor's ballast
tanks, as distinguished from various other projects at URI .... Rather,
Osborne relied on "interviews" with undisclosed URI employees and "outside
vendors," conducted either by himself or other URI officials who reported to
him. The trial court quite reasonably expected URI to explain, out of the
presence of the jury, the basic assumptions undergirding its witness's
seemingly unorthodox method of reconstruction.lu
Rather than provide foundation for Osborne's intended opinion testimony,
URI simply accepted a direct verdict on damages." The defendant prevailed at
trial as a result, and the A. W. Chesterton court affirmed the district court's
judgment.
Rule 703's expansion of the bases for expert testimony spawned questions
about the reasonableness of experts' reliance on particular data, facts or
information. Does the determination of reasonable reliance fall to the trial judge
or to the scientific community of which the expert is a member? There are both
liberal and restrictive approaches.'O Under the liberal view, an expert may form
an opinion by reasonably relying upon data used by other experts in the field, but
a trial court does not determine the trustworthiness of the subject data.' The
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1219.
180. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1243-44
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
181. The liberal view is best illustrated by Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986). In
Zenith Radio, the defendants attacked the plaintiffs' experts' opinions because the experts
relied on materials that were independently ruled inadmissible, and based some reports
on documents of questionable reliability. Id. at 1320. The plaintiffs argued (1) that
expert testimony may consist of any matter found in the expert's field of expertise and
(2) the expert determines whether the facts or opinions that formulate the testimony are
reasonably relied upon in the field and trustworthy. The defendants argued that the court
must (1) decide the question of whether the facts or opinions are reasonably reliable; and
(2) restrict the amount of inadmissible data on which experts may rely. Id. at 1324.
The district court excluded portions ofthe expert reports, holding that experts may
not reasonably rely on untrustworthy materials. The experts submitted affidavits stating
that the data on which they relied -was generally relied upon by experts in their fields.
The court rejected the statements, choosing to formulate a set ofjudicial standards for
determining the reasonableness of expert reliance. Applying its new standards, the court
determined that the expert opinions were inadmissible. Id. at 1379-80.
The Third Circuit reversed. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723
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restrictive view requires a trial court to decide whether the data are reasonably
relied on by other experts in the field and determine the trustworthiness of the
data."' Under either approach experts must disclose the bases for their opinions,
for only then can trial courts determine whether the experts' reliance is
reasonable.'
Rule 703 allows experts to rely on facts or data that are inadmissible in
evidence."' More specifically, Rule 703 permits expert witnesses to rely on
hearsay to support their opinions, so long as it is reasonable for experts in the
field to do so. 8 ' Trial courts remain obligated to determine whether an expert's
F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The appellate
court disagreed with an independentjudicial test of reasonable reliance under Rule 703.
'The proper inquiry is not what the court deems reliable, but what experts in the relevant
discipline deem it to be." Id. at 276. The district court misinterpreted Rule 703 by
placing its opinion of reasonable reliance before that of the experts. The Third Circuit
explained that under Rule 703 there is broad foundation for expert opinion based on what
experts deem reliable. Once a court determines that the data is reasonably relied upon
in the subject field, rigorous inquiry into trustworthiness should be left for cross-
examination. Id. at 277.
182. The more restrictive Rule 703 approach is exemplified by In re "Agent
Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affid, 818
F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987). In "Agent Orange," Vietnam veterans and their families sued
the manufacturers of the herbicide Agent Orange, alleging that exposure to the chemical
caused injury and death. The defendants asserted that Agent Orange was not causally
connected to the various claimed injuries. To support their claims on the difficult
causation issue, the plaintiffs offered their medical experts' affidavits, which were based
on anecdotal information, hearsay, and checklists of symptoms and medical histories
provided by plaintiffs' counsel. Id at 1230-39.
The "Agent Orange" court believed that Rule 703 required it to examine the
reliability of experts' sources. Id. at 1244. The court concluded that the opinions lacked
sufficient bases under any degree of scrutiny, noting that "no reputable physician relies
on hearsay checklists [prepared] by litigants to reach a conclusion with respect to the
cause of their afflictions." Id. at 1246. The opinions were further flawed because the
experts relied on inapposite literature and failed to consider critical epidemiologic studies
and other possible causes of disease. See id. at 1250-53. Accordingly, the court
excluded the opinions and entered summary judgment for the defendants. Id. at 1256,
1264.
183. Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 966 F.2d 1464, 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
184. The second sentence of Rule 703 provides: "If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject,
the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence." FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis
added).
185. Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir.
1997); First Nat'l Bank of Louisville v. Lustig, 96 F.3d 1554, 1576 (5th Cir. 1996)
("Experts may rely on hearsay evidence in forming their opinions."); Marcel v. Placid Oil
Co., 11 F.3d 563, 567 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1125
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reliance on particular facts or data is reasonable.'8 If the proponent cannot
establish that it was reasonable for the expert to rely on the hearsay being
attacked, the court should exclude the expert's testimony. 87
Courts presume that experts properly evaluate hearsay and give it
appropriate probative weight when forming their opinions. 8' Foundational
hearsay may come as documents, data from unrelated studies, witness
statements, or simple conversations with other experts. Rule 703 thus appears
to create a "back door" exception to the general prohibition of hearsay.
Fortunately, Rule 703's back door does not open wide.
The fact that an expert's opinion is premised on inadmissible evidence does
not make that evidence admissible for other purposes.8 9 A party cannot use
hearsay relied on by an expert witness to prove the truth ofthe matters contained
in the inadmissible evidence." A party cannot sneak in otherwise inadmissible
hearsay through an expert witness if the expert did not rely on the evidence when
forming his opinions. 91 For example, a plaintiff who needs to introduce
documents to prove his case, but cannot lay the foundation for the documents,
cannot cure his evidentiary problems simply by making the documents part of
an expert's file. Pelster v. Ray"' illustrates Rule 703's hearsay limits.
In Pelster, plaintiffs Vernon and Michelle Pelster alleged that two
individual defendants rolled back the odometer on a car they purchased. The
Peisters also sued Earl and Joyce Morton for passing the rolled-back car through
their business, South Central Auto Auction." At trial, the Pelsters called a state
investigator, Tom Ley, as an expert witness. The trial court allowed Ley to
testify that the odometers had been rolled back on at least four other cars while
(10th Cir. 1993) (apparently assuming expert's reliance was reasonable); South Cent.
Petroleum, Inc. v. Long Bros. Oil Co., 974 F.2d 1015, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992); Kingsley
Assocs., Inc. v. Del-Met, Inc., 918 F.2d 1277, 1286-87 (6th Cir. 1990); Doctor's Hosp.,
Inc. v. Southeast Med. Alliance, Inc., 878 F. Supp.884, 886 (E.D. La. 1995); Jobin v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 160 Bankr. 161, 172 (D. Colo. 1993).
186. Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670,682 (3d Cir. 1991).
187. See, e.g., Redman v. John D. Brush & Co., 111 F.3d 1174, 1179 (4th Cir.
1997); Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362,371-72 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Gaskell, 985 F.2d 1056, 1060-62 (1 th Cir. 1993) (also relying on Rule 403); Gong v.
Hirsch, 913 F.2d 1269, 1272-73 (7th Cir. 1990).
188. United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 938 (2d Cir. 1993).
189. Boone v. Moore, 980 F.2d 539, 542 (8th Cir. 1992); In re James Wilson
Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 173 (7th Cir. 1992).
190. Engebretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 21 F.3d 721, 728 (6th Cir. 1994); see,
e.g., Finchum v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F.3d 526, 531-32 (7th Cir. 1995).
191. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Groskin, 927 F.2d 722, 725-26 (2d Cir. 1991); Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. W.R. Grace & Co., 781 F. Supp. 420,427 (D.S.C. 1991).
192. 987 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1993).
193. Id. at 516.
19971
31
Richmond: Richmond: Regulating Expert Testimony
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
ASSOURTLAWREVIEW
they were in South Central's possession. The Pelsters offered this "similar acts"
evidence to prove that the Mortons knew that they were auctioning rolled-back
cars, and that they intended their customers to rely on false mileage
representations.' " Ley also testified that of the 350 South Central vehicles he
examined in his investigation, 300 had their odometers rolled back when they
went through South Central. He also testified that South Central sold 204 more
cars that U.S. Wholesales, a separate business, rolled back.19s
Ley obtained his information from numerous sources, including automobile
owners, dealers, auctioneers, state agencies, and a confidential informant.19 Ley
presumably relied on these sources to support his conclusion that the odometers
were rolled back on 300 of the 350 cars South Central auctioned during his
investigation. Similarly, he based his conclusion that South Central sold 204
cars rolled back by U.S. Wholesales on these sources.197
The Pelster court found that Ley's testimony was inadmissible hearsay.
[Un order to prove that the Mortons knew that U.S. Wholesales
was selling rolled-back cars through South Central or that they
intended to defraud subsequent purchasers through a common
plan, the Pelsters must first show that U.S. Wholesales was, in
fact, selling rolled-back cars through South Central. To make
that intermediate showing, they must initially prove that, at some
point before the cars passed through South Central, the mileage
reading on the cars' odometers had decreased by comparing the
readings on the two dates. If the Pelsters did not offer the out-of-
court statements upon which Ley relied to prove the truth of those
mileage figures, then the Pelsters cannot prove the first
proposition in their evidentiary chain (that an initial mileage
reading was higher than a subsequent reading).'98
Consequently, the Pelsters could never support an inference that the Mortons
knew of the alleged fraud.199
Unfortunately, the distinction between permitting jurors to receive hearsay
for the limited purpose of explaining an expert's opinion versus admitting the
evidence to prove the truth of the data or information is subtle. Attorneys who
elicit experts' supporting data or information before juries on direct examination
typically do so without fear of limiting instructions. If trial lawyers are disturbed
194. Id. at 518.
195. Id. at 518-19.
196. Id. at 525.
197. Id.
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by their adversaries' use of Rule 703 as a means of persuading jurois, and they
should be, such concern at least teaches that Rule 703 is a useful trial weapon for
two reasons. First, it allows experts to base their opinions on inadmissible data.
Second, it allows a party to effectively present inadmissible evidence to the jury
in the guise of foundation?3
Another Rule 703 problem meriting consideration is an expert witness'
reliance on the opinions of other experts. In other words, does Rule 703 permit
an expert witness to base his opinions in part on the opinions of experts in other
fields, or on the opinions of other experts in the same field? If the other experts
on whose opinions the challenged expert relies also testify in the same case, the
answer probably is yes.' Ifthe other experts do not testify, the answer probably
is no." In the latter situation, the expert's opponent is subjected to the
testimony of an expert he cannot cross-examine 3 The problem worsens if the
testifying expert is unfamiliar with the absent expert's methodology, because
such unfamiliarity virtually precludes any assessment ofthe absent expert's work
through the testifying expert's cross-examination? 4, Not only is the opponent
deprived of meaningful cross-examination, such use of a second expert's
testimony makes the testifying expert a vehicle or conduit for circumventing the
prohibition of hearsayP
° I
The fact that a testifying expert relied on another expert's report does not
make that report admissible; such a report is hearsay and it lacks the guarantee
of trustworthiness that should accompany expert testimony? 6 Rule 703 does not
permit the simple transmission of hearsay; it only permits experts to base their
200. See FAUsTF. RossI, EV1DENCEFORThETRIALLAWYER 160-61 (Nat'l Practice
Inst. 1995) (discussing Rule 703's limits and its relationship with Rule 403 in such
situations).
201. See, e.g., Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 834 F.
Supp. 1422, 1435-37 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'don other grounds, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995); United States v. 1,014.16 Acres of Land, 558
F. Supp. 1238, 1241-42 (W.D. Mo. 1983), afftd, 739 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1984).
202. United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132, 1143-44 (4th Cir. 1994);
TK-7 Corp. v. Estate ofBarbouti, 993 F.2d 722,732-33 (10th Cir. 1993).
203. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d at 1143.
204. TK-7 Corp., 993 F.2d at 732.
205. See id. at 732-733 (citing In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 173 (7th
Cir. 1992). A few courts in those states with Rule 703 equivalents have reached similar
conclusions. See, e.g., C.S.I. Chem. Sales, Inc. v. MAPCO Gas Prods., Inc., 557 N.W.2d
528, 531 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); Bruflat v. Mister Guy, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1996); Primaverav. Celotex Corp., 608 A.2d 515, 521 (Pa. Super. CL 1992),
appeal denied, 622 A.2d 1374 (Pa. 1993); Todd v. Williams, 409 S.E.2d 450,451-52
(Va. 1991).
206. Polythane Sys., Inc. v. Marina Ventures Int'l, Ltd., 993 F.2d 1201, 1207-08
(5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 4 F.3d 992 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1116 (1994).
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opinions on hearsay under certain circumstances. Moreover, another expert's
report specifically prepared for purposes of litigation does not, by definition,
constitute facts or data of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in any
particular field. 07
Rule 703 clearly does not permit a testifying expert to bolster his opinions
by relying on the work of other experts.20 s A testifying expert cannot rely on the
work of another expert in the field and then bolster his opinions or enhance his
credibility by stating that the expert on whose work he relied agrees with him.2 9
What is really at stake in many Rule 703 and Rule 705 disputes is the
division of labor among the various players at trial.210 In the Rule 703 context,
trial judges must decide whether evidence "is substantively reliable proof of a
fact in issue, and further whether the jury is likely to misuse the [evidence] as
proof of another fact."21 Courts should freely give limiting instructions to
prevent potential evidentiary abuses. In all instances the burden of calling
attention to flawed bases for experts' opinions falls squarely on trial lawyers 2
If an expert describes the bases for his opinions in accordance with Rule 703,
opposing counsel must timely and incisively object on direct examination and
further attack the expert's foundation on cross-examination. If the expert
testifies in conformity with Rule 705, opposing counsel must cross-examine the
expert so effectively that the trial court is compelled to strike the expert's
testimony.
D. The Overlap Between Rules 702 and 703
Because Rules 702 and 703 are closely intertwined, and because they lack
specificity, courts may approach essentially identical evidentiary problems under
either Rule. This is especially true when a party challenges the foundation for
an expert's opinions. Expert testimony may be attacked for insufficient
foundation under Rule 702 because, absent proper foundation, the expert's
intended testimony will not assist the trier of fact.2h 13 Expert testimony also may
207. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d at 1143.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Developing a Coherent Theory of the Structure
of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 47 MERCER L. REV. 447, 479-80 (1996) (discussing
Rule 703 and division of labor among jury, judge and expert witness).
211. Id. at479..
212. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784,793 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting
Michael H. Graham, Discovery ofExperts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895, 897), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981).
213. See Hines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 262,272 (3d Cir. 1991); see,
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be excluded under Rule 703, which speaks to the facts or data on which experts
base their opinions.214 A lack of foundation is sometimes fatal. Without
adequate foundation for their experts' opinions plaintiffs may not be able to
establish causation.2 " Expert witnesses cannot render opinions based on
speculation and conjecture.2 16
Challenges to the foundation for experts' opinions are not easily mounted.
Although experts may not ground their opinions in speculation and conjecture,
neither must their factual bases be so firm that they can testify with absolute
certainty2 " There is a vast gray area between these extremes. The best that can
be said is that experts must base their opinions on facts sufficient to support
reasonably accurate conclusions.2 8 Perhaps because this standard is so elusive,
e.g., Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1996) (expert's
testimony as to plaintiff's lost future earnings excluded as speculative under Rule 702);
Ansick v. Hillenbrand Indus., Inc., 933 F. Supp. 773, 780-81 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (expert
arguably not qualified and no foundation for conclusions ind opinions in affidavit).
214. See, e.g., Berry v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 989 F.2d 822, 827-28 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. deniedsub nom. Cooper v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 570 U.S. 1117 (1994)
Brown v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 919 F.2d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 1990).
215. See, e.g., Buckner v. Sam's Club, Inc., 75 F.3d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 1996)
(expert affidavit opposing summary judgment); Vadalav. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 44 F.3d
36,38-39 (1st Cir. 1995); Hayes v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 8 F.3d 88,92 (1st Cir. 1993)
(affidavit opposing summary judgment), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1126 (1994).
216. Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69,75 (3d Cir. 1996);
Guillory v. Domtar Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1331 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Air Disaster
at Lockerbie Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 824 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. Pan
American World Airways, Inc. v. Pagnucco, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995); Tyger Constr. Co.
v. Pensacola Constr. Co., 29 F.3d 137, 142 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 573 U.S. 1080
(1995); C.elia v. United States, 998 F.2d 418, 423 (7th Cir. 1993); see, e.g., Allen v.
Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198-99 (5th Cir. 1996) (toxicologists'
background information concerning plaintiff's chemical exposure was "so sadly lacking
as to be mere guesswork"); Buckner, 75 F.3d at 293-94 (expert's conclusion in affidavit
was "conjecture" and was "wholly without evidentiary support"); Trevino v. Gates, 99
F.3d 911, 922-23 (9th Cir. 1996) (experts' assumpiions concerning future income were
unfounded), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1249 (1997); CMI, Inc. v. Intoximeters, Inc., 918 F.
Supp. 1068, 1078-79 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (rejecting economist's testimony on lost sales
because, lacking foundation, his opinions were "sheer speculation"), appeal dismissed,
95 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Collier v. Varco-Pruden Bldgs., 911 F. Supp. 189, 191-92
(D.S.C. 1995) (rejecting construction expert's opinion based on speculation); Henry v.
Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237,246-47 (D.V.I. 1995) (rejecting expert
economist's opinion based on second expert's "unfounded conclusions').
217. Kieffer v. Weston Land, Inc., 90 F.3d 1496, 1499 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting
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the majority view is that foundational weaknesses go to the weight to be afforded
the expert's testimony, and not to its admissibility.2 9
E. Federal Rule of Evidence 403
Rule 403 expressly recognizes trial courts' broad control over the admission
of evidence. The Rule applies to all forms of evidence, whether demonstrative,
documentary or testimonial. Under Rule 403, relevant evidence "may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." The "unfair prejudice" to be weighed is the prejudice
to the party against whom the evidence is offered-not the prejudice the offering
party will experience if the evidence is not admitted.P
Because all material evidence is inherently prejudicial, only "unfair"
prejudice will compel the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence.m "Unfair
219. See Hose v. Chicago N.W. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1995)
(stating that only exception to this general rule is where expert's opinion is so
fundamentally unsupported that it cannot assist the jury); Gomez v. Martin Marrietta
Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1519 (10th Cir. 1995); Sparks v. Gilley Trucking Co., 992 F.2d 50,
54 (4th Cir. 1993); Concise Oil & Gas P'ship v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 986 F.2d
1463, 1476 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 990 F.2d 1254 (1993); United States v. L.E. Cooke
Co., 991 F.2d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 1993); see, e.g., Tuman v. Genesis Assocs., 935 F.
Supp. 1375, 1385-86 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
220. FED. R. EviD. 403.
221. LaPlante v. American Honda Motor Co., 27 F.3d 731, 740 (1st Cir. 1994).
While it seems strange to have to make so obvious a point, courts sometimes are
confused on this issue. See, e.g., Bilal v. Lockhart, 993 F.2d 643, 644 n.2 (8th Cir.) (trial
judge suggested that evidence's probative value had to be balanced against unfair
prejudice to the offeringparty were evidence not admitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 924
(1993).
222. See Graefv. Chemical Leaman Corp., 106 F.3d 112, 118 (5th Cir. 1997)
("Evidence is not prejudicial merely because admitting it may sway thejury against a
party."); Sutkiewicz v. Monroe County Sheriff, 110 F.3d 352, 360 (0th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Hahn, 17 F.3d 502, 509-10 (Ist Cir. 1994); United States v. Munoz, 36
F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d
725, 740 (1st Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, Martinez 115 S. Ct. 1164 (1995); United States
v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1007-08 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Harvey, 959 F.2d
1371, 1374 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Noland, 960 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (8th Cir.
1992) ("[Rule 403] does not protect against evidence that is prejudicial merely in the
sense that it is detrimental to a party's case."') (quoting United States v. Michaels, 726
F.2d 1307, 1315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984)); Durtsche v. American
Colloid Co., 958 F.2d 1007, 1012 (10th Cir. 1992) (allegations of contamination at
company facility were not unfairly prejudicial in a wrongfil termination action since they
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prejudice" means an "'undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one."'' '  But even
inflammatory evidence may be admissible depending on the context.?' In order
for a court to exclude evidence under Rule 403, the alleged unfair prejudice must
substantially outweigh the evidence's probative value.P "The truth may hurt,
but Rule 403 does not make it inadmissible on that account.' " 6
Rule 403 serves a "general screening function for otherwise admissible
evidence.' *27 The rule requires a trial court to balance the prejudicial effect of
challenged evidence against its probative value before admitting the evidence.m
The Rule 403 balancing test is applied after the challenged evidence passes
muster under Rules 702 and 703.1 The decision to exclude evidence under
Rule 403 hinges on the facts of the particular case; generalizations cannot be
made, and precedent is of relatively little value. 0 Rule 403 determinations are
committed to trial courts' discretion, l and appellate courts are reluctant to
established improper motive for firing the employee); George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d
26,31 (2d Cir. 1990) (any prejudice derived from probative force of the evidence; thus,
prejudice was not unfair).
223. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Thien, 63 F.3d 754,758 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting
United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782,796-97 (8th Cir. 1980)); see also United States
v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16,21 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Rule 403 advisory committee's note).
224. See, e.g., Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325, 1330-32 (6th Cir.
1994) (CEO's statements that he did not want to see his grandmother at Thanksgiving
because she was old, and that older people "should be confined to a concentration camp"
were admissible in age discrimination case).
225. See Senra v. Cunningham, 9 F.3d 168, 172 (lst Cir. 1993); United States v.
Medina, 992 F.2d 573, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1993); Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 874
F. Supp. 657,658 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
226. In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 538 (6th Cir.), afftd, 86 F.3d 498 (6th
Cir. 1996).
227. Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1112 (5th Cir. 1991).
228. United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 889 (3d Cir. 1994).
229. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
230. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1255 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), affld, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub noma. Lombardi v. Dow
Chemical Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
231. United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757-58 (7th Cir. 1996); West v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744,752 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995); Freeman v. City of Santa
Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1995); Daigle v. Maine Med. Ctr., Inc., 14 F.3d 684,
690 (1st Cir. 1994); Conway v. Icahn & Co., 16 F.3d 504,511 (2d Cir. 1994); Davis v.
Odeco, Inc., 18 F.3d 1237, 1247 (5th Cir. 1994); Joseph v. Terminix Int'l Co., 17 F.3d
1282, 1284 (10th Cir. 1994); Bilal v. Lockhart, 993 F.2d 643, 644 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 924 (1993); Hurt v. Coyne Cylinder Co., 956 F.2d 1319, 1328 (6th Cir. 1992);
Wallace v. Mulholland, 957 F.2d 333,336 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 980 (1992);
Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d462, 467 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
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reverse trial courts' decisions. 2 Trial courts tend to invoke Rule 403 sparingly,
preferring to admit questionable evidence accompanied by a limiting
instruction. 3
In a recent criminal case, Old Chief v. United States, 4 the Supreme Court
attempted to explain the appropriate balancing under Rule 403 when weighing
alleged unfair prejudice against probative value. The issue in Old Chief was
whether a criminal defendant can force the government to stipulate to an element
of a crime in order to avoid related prejudice, or whether the government retains
the right to present its own evidence?25 More particularly, does a district court
abuse its discretion by spurning a defendant's offer to stipulate when the
government's insistence on proving the element of the crime raises the risk of a
verdict tainted by improper consideration? 6 The Court held that it does? 7
In deciding the narrow issue before it, the Court examined two basic
alternatives with respect to Rule 403 balancing. First, an item of evidence
"might be viewed as an island, with estimates of its own probative value and
unfairly prejudicial risk the sole reference points in deciding whether the danger
substantially outweighs the value and whether the evidence ought to be
excluded." ' The Court rejected this alternative, reasoning that such an
interpretation of Rule 403 would allow the proponent to structure the trial "in
whatever way would produce the maximum unfair prejudice consistent with
relevance."' 9 The proponent could discard probative evidence with little
Courts' exercise of their Rule 403 discretion is limited to jury trials. In a bench
trial, a court can hear relevant evidence, weigh its probative value, and reject improper
inferences. Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626, 631-32 (4th Cir. 1994); see, e.g., United
States v. Hall, 969 F.2d 1102, 1109-10 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
232. See Kelly v. Boeing Pet. Servs., Inc., 61 F.3d 350,360 (5th Cir. 1995); Berry
v. Deloney, 28 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1994); Newell Puerto Rico, Ltd. v. Rubbermaid
Inc., 20 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1994). For rare cases reversing trial courts' Rule 403
determinations, see Sutkiewicz v. Monroe County Sheriff, 110 F.3d 352, 360 (6th Cir.
1997), Brock v.Caterpillar, Inc., 94 F.3d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1428 (1997), Westcott v. Crinklaw, 68 F.3d 1073, 1077-78 (8th Cir. 1995), and
Buscaglia v. United States, 25 F.3d 530, 533-34 (7th Cir. 1994).
233. See Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414, 1420 (10th Cir.) (trial court
did not err by admitting allegedly "inflammatory and misleading" videotape because it
gave a limiting instruction), cert denied, 177 S. Ct. 61 (1996); United States v. Lasanta,
978 F.2d 1300, 1307-08 (2d Cir. 1992) (evidence admissible under Rule 403 where
district court gave limiting instruction).
234. 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
235. See id at 646.
236. Id at 647.
237. Id at 647, 655-56.
238. Id at651.
239. Id at 652.
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prejudicial effect in favor of unproperly influential evidence; the worst he would
have to fear would be a ruling sustaining a Rule 403 objection, at which point
he could fall back on the benign substitute evidence?4 Rule 403 does not confer
such autonomy on the party who stands to benefit from the evidentiary taint? 41
Second, the question of admissibility under Rule 403 might invite further
evidentiary comparisons to take account of the full evidentiary context of the
case as the district court understands it when asked to rule.242 This approach
would require trial courts to first determine whether a particular item of evidence
raises a specter of unfir prejudice?4 3 But, unlike the first alternative, the court's
analysis cannot stop there. The court must then go on to evaluate the degrees of
probative value and unfair prejudice not only for the evidence in question, but
also for "any actually available substitutes." 2" If alternative evidence carries
equal probative weight with less prejudicial risk, the court should discount the
value of the evidence first offered?4 The court should then exclude the evidence
if its discounted probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice?' Ajudge has to make these calculations "with an appreciation
of the offering party's need for evidentiary richness and narrative integrity in
presenting a case.. 241
The Old Chiefcourt elected the second approach based on its reading of
Rule 403's companions-Rule 401 and 404-and the related Advisory
Committee Notes?" The probative value of an item of evidence under Rule 403
is distinct from its relevance under Rule 401,9 and it may be determined by
comparing evidentiary alternatives.5 ° When Rule 403 confers judicial discretion
by providing that evidence "may" be excluded, such discretion may be informed
by more than assessing a particular piece of evidence's twin tendencies to
prejudice and to prove?5' A court's discretionary judgment may be informed by
240. Id
241. Id




246. Id (emphasis added).
247. Id
248. Id at 652.
249. FED. R.EVID.401. Rule 401 provides: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." Id
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going beyond that initial assessment to make like assessments of other evidence
for purposes of comparison, and by examining evidentiary alternatives.22
Old Chief is unremarkable outside the criminal law context. Advocates
have long offered courts evidentiary alternatives when arguing against the
admission of potentially prejudicial evidence. Courts are routinely persuaded
that, in light of available alternatives, challenged evidence should be weighed on
a more sensitive scale. Old Chiefimerely articulates what good advocates and
careful courts have done all along.
Expert testimony presents special problems.- 3 Evidence delivered through
an expert can be powerful and simultaneously very misleading because of the
difficulty in evaluating it.24 A trial court weighing possible prejudice against
probative value under Rule 403 must therefore exercise more control over
experts than over lay witnesses.P5
Because Rule 403's application defies generalization, it is no surprise that
courts have relied on Rule 403 to exclude expert testimony and scientific
evidence in a variety of circumstances. In Davidson v. Smith, 6 the Second
Circuit affirmed a district court's decision to exclude evidence of the plaintiff's
psychiatric history.2 The Davidson plaintiff had been confined in an institution
for the criminally ill some 15 years prior to trial. 8
The court in Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc.32-9
refused to allow testimony "that large companies often sue small competitors. ' 2*
Even if such a statement is properly expert testimony, which it is not, "whatever
marginal relevance the testimony ha[d] would be swamped by its potential for
distraction of the jury and undue prejudice .. ."Ill
The Bennett v. PRC Public Sector, Inc.211 court determined that the
probative value of the expert's testimony was "eviscerated" because his
conclusions were "untested and [were] based on unreliable information .... " 263
252. Id
253. See United States v. Carswell, 922 F.2d 876, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("[I]f a
witness' expertise on a subject appears to be attenuated or questionable, then the trial
court may conclude that the danger of prejudice merely from labeling him an 'expert'
outweighs the possibility that his testimony would be helpful.").
254. Weinstein, supra note 8, at 632.
255. Weinstein, supra note 8, at 632.
256. 9 F.3d 4 (2d Cir. 1993).
257. Id. at 7.
258. Id.
259. 932 F. Supp. 220 (N.D. IMI. 1996).
260. Id. at 225.
261. Id.
262. 931 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
263. Id. at 502-03.
[Voel. 62
40
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/2
EXPERT TESTIMONY
As a result, the probative value of his testimony was "heavily outweighed by its
prejudicial effect," and the admission of his testimony "would create a serious
danger of confusing the issues or misleading thejury.'"'A The Bennett court thus
employed Rule 403 to preclude the expert's testimony.
In United States v. Rincon,265 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court's
exclusion of expert testimony on the psychological aspects of eyewitness
identification. The P'ncon court agreed with the district court that the proffered
expert testimony would confuse and mislead the jury, thus rendering it more
prejudicial than probative?' 6
In Evans v. Mathis Funeral Home, Inc.,.'- the court refused to allow a
human factors expert to testify about the conditions contributing to the plaintiff's
fall.268 The Evans court concluded that because the subject of the expert's
intended testimony was within jurors' common knowledge, the danger of
prejudice outweighed the probative value of the expert testimony.269
The Conti v. Commissioner270 plaintiffs voluntarily took polygraph tests
without the Tax Court's or IRS counsel's knowledge to try and prove their cash
hoard claim. The Tax Court held that the polygraph results were unreliable and
refused to admit them. 1 The Tax Court also excluded the results under Rule
403.3 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court on the latter basis. The Conti
court observed that the prejudicial effect of unilateral polygraph tests outweighs
their probative value because the party offering them does not have an adverse
interest at stake when taking the test. 3
The Rule 403 standard a court applies is critical. The trial court in
Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co.2 4 rejected two
expert economists' testimony in an antitrust case. One basis for the trial court's
decision was its application of Rule 403 to the economists' intended testimony.
The trial court excluded the expert testimony under Rule 403 because it was "not
264. Id. at 503.
265. 984 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1993).
266. Id. at 1006.
267. 996 F.2d 266 (1lth Cir. 1993).
268. The expert intended to testify about the effect each of the following factors
had in causing the plaintiff's fall: (1) uneven risers and treads on the subject stairs; (2)
the fact that the patio and stairs were brick; (3) the height of the handrail on the stairs;
and (4) the dim light. Id. at 268.
269. Id.
270. 39 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995).
271. Id. at 661.
272. Id. at 662.
273. Id. at 663.
274. 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Moyer Packing Co. v.
Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc., 510 U.S. 994 (1993).
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more probative than prejudicial. 27 The Third Circuit reversed, noting that
exclusion under Rule 403 requires that the probative value of the challenged
evidence must be "substantially outweighed" by the rule's stated dangers.276
Relevant evidence may also be excluded under Rule 403 if it might confuse
the issues or mislead the jury.2r As with unfair prejudice, courts' determinations
that evidence will potentially confuse the issues or mislead the jury turn on the
facts of the particular case. It is impossible to identify particular factors or types
of evidence uniformly warranting exclusion based on their potential to mislead
or confuse2V As a general statement, it can probably be said that Rule 403 will
275. Id. at 1237.
276. Id. at 1239.
277. See, e.g., Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 685-86 (9th Cir. 1994) (in death
sentence case it was not error to exclude evidence of bungled hangings in other
jurisdictions; other executions could not be reliably compared to protocol at issue);
Monotype Corp. PLC v. International Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 1994)
(in intellectual property case district court properly excluded testimony about industry
moral code and copied typefaces; even were evidence relevant, it would confuse the
jury); United States v. Brechtel, 997 F.2d 1108,1113-14 (5th Cir.) (bank officer charged
with improperly benefitting from transactions not allowed to elicit habit evidence to
negate mental state required for conviction; chain of analogies required to ground
relevance could have confused the jury), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1013 (1993);
International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 998 F.2d 504, 505-06,
508 (7th Cir. 1993); Jetcraft Corp. v. Flight Safety Int'l, 16 F.3d 362, 365 (10th Cir.
1993) (excluding evidence of FAA enforcement actions taken against defendants after
airplane crash); United States v. Valencia, 957 F.2d 1189, 1194-96 (5th Cir.) (excluding
foreign language tape that might confuse the issues or mislead the jury; effective limiting
instruction could not be given), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 889 (1992); Bizzle v. McKesson
Corp., 961 F.2d 719, 721-22 (8th Cir. 1992) (proper to exclude evidence of subsequent
remedial measure in product liability case where evidence would likely confuse the jury);
United States v. Waloke, 962 F.2d 824, 830 (8th Cir. 1992) (Rule 403 used to exclude
evidence of specific instances of conduct because evidence was unfairly prejudicial,
confusing and misleading, and would have created collateral mini-trials); Paradigm Sales,
Inc. v. Weber Marking Sys., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1247, 1252-53 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (expert
testimony on irrelevant matters "would certainly confuse the issues" and was thus
inadmissible under Rule 403); Tilton v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 751,753
(N.D. Okla. 1995) (excluding expert linguist's proposed testimony about how certain
rhetorical devices or speech patterns convey implied meanings because it would confuse
the jury and it was "a waste of time"), affd, 95 F.3d 32 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 947 (1997).
278. Certain recurring situations do, however, give rise to claims of confusion or
allegations that jurors will be misled. A listing and discussion of such situations may be
found in JAC.K B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
403[4], at 403-66 to 403-70 (1996) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN].
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exclude as confusing or misleading that evidence which "might unduly distract
the jury from the main issues" in the case?79
Finally, Rule 403 permits courts to exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or the needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 2 .0 Trial
judges must have discretion to exclude cumulative evidence in order to try cases
efficiently;, however, Rule 403 does not give courts license to exclude
evidence that may delay trial without regard for its probative value. A trial court
that excludes crucial evidence in the pursuit of efficiency or out of a need for
expedience abuses its discretion.8 2
F. Federal Rule of Evidence 704
Under the old "ultimate issue rule," expert witnesses were prohibited from
offering opinions that would decide an issue? This common law doctrine was
based on the premise that an expert's opinion on ultimate facts "would invade
the province of the jury." In practice, however, neither the rule nor its
rationale worked for a number of reasons: First, it was often impossible to
separate ultimate facts from other facts; second, it was sometimes impossible for
a witness to express his opinion in anything other than ultimate facts; third, the
ultimate issue rule's rationale made little sense in light of the fact that experts
cannot invade the jury's province because jurors are always free to draw their
own conclusions; and, fourth, it was often impossible for courts to distinguish
279. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
280. FED. R. EviD. 403..
281. See United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1504 (7th Cir.) (district court did
not err by excluding evidence that "would have been an unwarranted waste of precious
judicial time in... a long, protracted and tedious trial"), cert. deniedsub nor. Usman
v. United States, 498 U.S. 863 (1990).
282. See, e.g., De Andav. City of Long Beach, 7 F.3d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1993)
(by limiting witness' testimony, district court impaired plaintiff's ability to prove his civil
rights claim); Zaken v. Boerer, 964 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (2d Cir.) (testimony wrongly
excluded under Rule 403), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 975 (1992); Secretary of Labor v.
DeSisto, 929 F.2d 789,794-96 (1st Cir. 1991) (trial court committed reversible error by
limiting number of witnesses without balancing need for efficiency against negative
consequences of excluding evidence; witness limitation "prevented both partiem from
presenting sufficient evidence on which to base a reliable judgment"); First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. Hollingsworth, 931 F.2d 1295, 1304-05 (8th Cir. 1991) (harshly
criticizing trial court's decision to bar defendant's testimony).
283. WEINSTEIN, supra note 278, 704[01], at 704-06 (quoting M.C. Slough,
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between testimony on ultimate facts and legal conclusions."' More
fundamentally, the ultimate issue rule deprived juries of the full benefit of expert
witnesses' judgment.
The enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 704 abolished the common law
ultimate issue rule.86 Rule 704 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or
condition of a defendant is a criminal case may state an opinion or inference
as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.2 7
The Rule 704(a) requirement that testimony on an ultimate issue be
"otherwise admissible" means that expert testimony must be admissible under
Rules 702,703, 705 and 403.2a In short, challenged expert testimony must clear
a number of evidentiary hurdles before it is ever subject to attack under Rule
704. Rarely will any case be decided solely by application of Rule 704.289 Rule
704 merely focuses courts' attention on whether "ultimate issue" testimony is
otherwise admissible.2 °
Rule 704(a) is not particularly helpful when expert testimony is couched in
terms ofa legal standard. While fact-based conclusions are permissible, ultimate
legal conclusions are not; unfortunately, the line between these two testimonial
285. Id. 704[01], at 704-706 to 704-07.
286. United States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d 471,479 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1000 (1981).
287. FED. R. EVID. 704.
288. See generally United States v. Moore, 997 F.2d 55, 57-58 (5th Cir. 1993)
(observing that in order for expert testimony to be admissible under Rule 704, it must
first satisfy Rules 701 and 702); Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1100-01
(10th Cir. 1991) (expert testimony satisfied Rule 702); United States v. Schatzle, 901
F.2d 252,257 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting applicability of Rules 702 and 403); United States
v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1441 (4th Cir.) (discussing Rules 701,702, 703, 705 and 403
relative to Rule 704), cert denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988); Mathie v. Fries, 935 F. Supp.
1284, 1295-96 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome was
inadmissible under Rules 702 and 403, and therefore could not be admitted under Rule
704); see also FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note (describing interplay
between Rules 701, 702 and 403, and Rule 704).
289. WEINSTE., supra note 278, 704 [02], at 704-10.
290. Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir. 1985).
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categories is a fine one that depends on the circumstances of the case.291 Courts
are all over the board. For example, the Heflin v. Stewart Count;P, court held
that Rule 704(a) permitted a corrections expert to testify that the defendants were
"deliberately indifferent' to an inmate's medical needs in a civil rights case.P
In Berry v. City of Detroit,2 the Sixth Circuit held that nearly identical
testimony' s constitutes an inadmissible legal conclusion. 2I In the products
liability context, the court in Strickland v. Royal Lubricant Co.27 refused to
allow the plaintiff's expert witness to testify that a warning was "inadequate" as
.that term was defined under Alabama law.P The Strickland court reasoned that
such testimony "would not be factual evidence but rather would constitute an
attempt to instruct on the application of the law.., and the legal implications of
the defendant's conduct.'  The Strong v. E.. DuPont de Nemours Co." court
held that the plaintiff's expert engineer could not testify that the defendant's
products were unreasonably dangerous. The Strong court accepted the district
courts reasoning that the expert's opinion expressed inadequately explored legal
criteria that would not assist the jury.31 The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand,
has freely admitted such testimony 2 2
Negligence cases also produce disparate holdings, even though an expert's
expression of a party's negligence should clearly be inadmissible as a legal
conclusion? °3 In Neilson v. Armstrong Rubber Co.,314 the Eighth Circuit held
291. See Burkhart v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 112 F.3d 1207, 1212
(D.C. Cir. 1997); AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Dwyer, 899 F. Supp. 1200, 1202 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
292. 958 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1992).
293. Id. at 714-16.
294. 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1111 (1995).
295. The expert equated "gross negligence" with "deliberate indifference." The
expert's use of the latter term particularly disturbed the court. Id. at 1353.
296. Id. at 1353-54.
297. 911 F. Supp. 1460 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
298. Id. at 1469.
299. Id.
300. 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1981).
301. Id. at 686.
302. E.g., Quinton v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 335,338 (10th Cir. 1991)
(veterinarian allowed to opine that animal feed was unreasonably dangerous); Karns v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1459 (10th Cir. 1987) (expert allowed to testify that
weed eater was "unreasonably dangerous beyond the expectation of the average user").
303. See, e.g., Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R.R., 882 F.2d 705,707-10 (2d
Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs expert should not have been allowed to "testifl-y] bluntly that 'the
railroad was negligent"); Shahid v. City of Detroit, 889 F.2d 1543, 1547-48 (6th Cir.
1989) (plaintiff's expert not allowed to testify that police officers were negligent);
Hermitage Indus. v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 814 F. Supp. 484, 485-87 (D.S.C. 1993)
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that an expert could testify that the defendant's manufacturing process caused the
defect in a tire?" On the other side of the causation coin is Owen v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 3o in which the Fifth Circuit held that a question asking an expert
to opine as to the cause of a pipeline explosion impermissibly sought a legal
conclusion.30 7
Despite the many confusing decisions that might seem to suggest otherwise,
Rule 704(a) does not permit expert witnesses to state legal conclusions."s The
rule was never intended to allow experts to offer opinions embodying legal
conclusions.P The ultimate issues to which expert witnesses testify, therefore,
must be fact issues" A court's admission of legal conclusions or opinions is
improper because such evidence or testimony threatens to usurp the jury's role
as factfmder?"
Experts should not be allowed to use Rule 704 as a vehicle to attack the
credibility of an opposing witness? 12 An expert cannot "pass judgment on a
(defendant's expert could not testify that plaintiffwas negligent).
304. 570 F.2d 272 (8th Cir. 1978).
305. Id. at 276-77.
306. 698 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1983).
307. Id. at 239-40.
308. Weston v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 78 F.3d 682, 684 n.4 (D.C.
Cir.), amendedon rebhg, 86 F.3d 216 (1996); Snap-Drape, Inc. v. Commissioner, 98 F.3d
194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Racicot, 87 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir.
1996); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1353-54 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1111 (1995); Estes v. Moore, 993 F.2d 161, 163 (8th Cir. 1993); Hygh v. Jacobs,
961 F.2d 359,363 (2d Cir. 1992); Evans v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 25, 936 F.2d 472,
476 (10th Cir. 1991); Parker v. Williams, 855 F.2d 763, 777 (11th Cir. 1988); see, e.g.,
State ex rel. Montgomery v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247, 1254 (S.D.
Ohio 1996) (refusing to allow experts to testify that defendants conspired to violate
antitrust laws; any such testimony would embrace legal conclusions).
309. United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir.), reh'g granted, 856 F.2d
5 (1988).
310. See Miksis v. Howard, 106 F.3d 754,761-62 (7th Cir. 1997) (allowing sleep
deprivation expert to testify about driver fatigue as factual causation under Rule 704(a));
Zuchel v. City of Denver, 997 F.2d 730, 742-43 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing police
deadly force practices).
311. See Yannacopoulos v. General Dynamics Corp., 75 F.3d 1298, 1301, 1302
(8th Cir. 1996) (excluding a letter containing "a conclusory statement of a legal
opinion").
312. See United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Samara, 643 F.2d 701,705 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 829 (1981). Neither the
Azure court nor the Samara court expressly relied upon Rule 704 to reject the experts'
testimony on credibility. See Azure, 801 F.2d at 340-41; Samara, 643 F.2d at 705.
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witness' truthfulness in the guise of a professional opinion.:3 3  The
determination of witnesses' credibility should be left strictly to the jury.31 4
At least one commentator suggests that the "very existence of Rule 704(b)
implies that federal courts have misinterpreted Rule 704(a) by improperly
excluding so-called impermissible legal conclusions."35 Supposedly, the Rule
704(b) exclusion of expert testimony offered to show the defendant's state of
mind directly related to the crime or defense at issue316 in a criminal case is the
only limitation on expert witnesses' expression of legal conclusions?17 Rule
704(b) necessarily implies that only one exception (psychiatric testimony in
criminal cases) exists to Rule 704(a)'s abrogation of the ultimate issue rule; were
it otherwise, Rule 704(b) would be "unnecessary surplusage. 318
Even if this restrictive view of Rule 704(a) is accurate, which is unclear,
expert testimony in the form of legal conclusions is not necessarily admissible.
Such an interpretation of Rule 704(a) ignores the fact that the rule is not
exclusionary;" 9 rather, it simply requires "ultimate issue" testimony to be
"otherwise admissible." Opinions that are phrased in terms of "inadequately
explored legal criteria" or that "merely tell the jury what result to reach" are
inadmissible under Rules 702 and 403, and are thus inadmissible under Rule
704(a)?20 Rule 704(a) incorporates Rule 702's "helpfulness" requirement.
Thus, expert testimony that is "unhelpful" because it merely states a legal
conclusion, or because the expert simply tells the jury what result to reach, is
routinely excluded 2' If the expert is in no better position than ajuror to reach
the ultimate conclusion at issue, Rule 704 will not make the expert's opinion
admissible23 " An expert's statement of a legal conclusion is also inadmissible
under Rule 702 because it is deemed to be outside the scope of the witness'
313. Westcottv. Crinklaw, 68 F.3d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1995).
314. See United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1441 (4th Cir.) (applying Rule 704
to psychiatric testimony), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988).
315. Cook, supra note 2, at 568.
316. See FED.R.EVID. 704(b).
317. Cook, supra note 2, at 568-69; see also United States v. Di Domenico, 985
F.2d 1159, 1163-64 (2d Cir. 1993) (describing Rule 704(b) as the "one salient exception"
to Rule 704(a)'s abrogation of the common law ultimate issue rule).
318. Cook, supra note 2, at 569.
319. United States v. Markum, 4 F.3d 891, 895 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Rule 704(a) is
a rule that allows expert testimony in, not one that keeps it out").
320. See United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405,414 (7th Cir. 1993); FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note.
321. See, e.g., Whitted, 11 F.3d at 785-87; Di Domenico, 985 F.2d at 1163-64;
United States v. Simpson, 7 F.3d 186, 188-89 (10th Cir. 1993).
322. See Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 305 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 1991), amended, 957 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1992).
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expertise.32 Expert methodology that fails the scientific inquiry required by
DauberI24 should not support "ultimate issue" testimony under Rule 704(a).
Experts should not be allowed to testify on ultimate issues that are scientifically
unsupportable 25 Finally, experts may not state legal conclusions because it is
the trial court's duty to instruct the jury on the law 26 Trial judges cannot
effectively delegite that duty to expert witnesses by allowing experts to state
legal conclusions 27
G. Parting Thoughts
Proposed expert testimony raises two related issues: First, expert testimony
may be inadmissible under any one or some combination of Rules 104(a), 702,
703,704 and 403. Second, the proffered expert testimony must be sufficient to
support a verdict for the proponent 28 The exclusion or rejection of expert
testimony may leave the proponent unable to prove its case. Even if the
challenged evidence is ultimately ruled admissible, it may be legally insufficient
to support the proponent's case. 29 Admissible expert testimony may not raise
a genuine issue of material fact, thus exposing the proponent to summary
judgment 3 0 The admissibility and sufficiency of scientific evidence
"necessitate different inquiries and involve different stakes." '' When a party's
case hangs in the balance, a court's evaluation of an expert's scientific
methodology and reasoning "may require a more complex determination than
323. Weston v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 78 F.3d 682, 684 n.4 (D.C.
Cir.), amended on reh 'g, 86 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
324. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
325. See, e.g., Gier v. Educational Serv. Unit No. 16, 845 F. Supp. 1342, 1347-53
(D. Neb. 1994), aff'd, 66 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995).
326. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1994),
cert. deniedsub nom. Pan American World Airways, Inc., v. Pagnucco, 111 S. Ct. 934
(1995); Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (1 1th Cir. 1990)
(stating that"the court must be the jury's only source of law"); Donnelly Corp. v. Gentex
Corp., 918 F. Supp. 1126, 1137 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
327. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1287 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied
sub nom. Mariani v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 939 (1995); Molecular Tech. Corp. v.
Valentine, 925 F.2d 910,919 (6th Cir. 1991).
328. William W. Schwarzer, Management of Expert Evidence, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON ScIENIFIc EvIDENcE 29 (1994).
329. Id.
330. See, e.g., Hammann v. United States, 24 F.3d 976, 981-83 (7th Cir. 1994);
Maffei v. Noythem Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 892, 897-900 (9th Cir. 1993).
331. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1132 (2d Cir. 1995).
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that required when the judge merely has to ascertain the availability of evidence
on an issue."312
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Federal court practitioners must appreciate and understand the expert
witness disclosure requirements imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.
The 1993 amendments to Rule 26 make expert discovery particularly daunting.
Rule 26(aX2), entitled "Disclosure of Expert Testimony," requires:
(A) In addition to the disclosures required by paragraph (1), a party
shall'disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at
trial to present evidence under Rules 702,703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
(B) Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, this
disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness. The
report shall contain a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and
the basis and reasons therefor, the data or other information considered by the
witness in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or
support for the opinions; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of
all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the
compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any
other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by
deposition within the preceding four years.
(C) These disclosures shall be made at the times and in the sequence
directed by the court. In the absence of other directions from the court or
stipulation by the parties, the disclosures shall be made at least 90 days before
the trial date or the date the case is to be ready for trial or, if the evidence is
intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter
identified by another party under paragraph 2(B), within 30 days after the
disclosure made by the other party. The parties shall supplement these
disclosures when required under subdivision (e)(1) 33
332. Margaret A. Berger, Evidentiary Framework, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
ScIENTIFIc EVIDENCE 52 (1994).
333. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(a)(2).
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A party is prohibited from deposing opposing experts before the experts provide
their reports required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B) s4 With respect to the scope and
limits of expert witness disclosure, Rule 26(b)(4)(B) provides:
A party may, through interrogatories or by deposition, discover facts known
or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by
another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is
not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b)
or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on
the same subject by other means 33
Rule 26(b)(4)(B) thus addresses discovery related to so-called "consulting
experts."
Parties' compliance with the Rule 26(a) expert disclosure requirements is
enforced by way of Rule 37. Rule 37(c)(1) provides:
(1) A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose
information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1) shall not, unless such failure
is harmless, be permitted to use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a
motion any witness or information not so disclosed. In addition to or in lieu
of this sanction, the court, on motion and after affording an opportunity to be
heard, may impose other appropriate sanctions. In addition to requiring
payment of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the
failure, these sanctions may include any of the actions authorized under
subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule and may
include informing the jury of the failure to make the disclosure?36
Under Rule 37(a)(3), a party's evasive or incomplete Rule 26 disclosure is
treated as a failure to disclose? 37
Rule 37(c)(1) operates to automatically exclude witnesses and information
that are not disclosed despite their required disclosure under Rule 26. Exclusion
under Rule 37(cX1) is "automatic" in the sense that an opposing party need not
first move to compel disclosure?3" This sanction was added to Rule 37 largely
to "put teeth into" the Rule 26 mandatory disclosure requirements?39
334. FED. R. Cv. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
335. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
336. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
337. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3).
338. 8A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT &RIcHARD L. MARcus, FEDERALPRACTICE AND
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A. An Overview of the Rule 26 Disclosure
Requirements and Their Effect
Five particular Rule 26 topics merit discussion. These are: (1) the
difference between opinions rendered under Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and
702, and the resulting effect on parties' disclosure obligations; (2) disclosing
treating physicians' opinions; (3) the disclosure of rebuttal testimony versus
impeachment evidence; (4) the disclosure of so-called "consulting experts"; and
(5) work-product protection for communications between attorneys and expert
witnesses.
1. Rule 701 v. Rule 702 Opinions
Opinion testimony in federal courts is not limited to expert opinions. Lay
witnesses may offeropinions in certain situations. 40 Federal Rule of Evidence
701 provides:
If the witness is not testil4ngas air expert; thewitness' testimony in the form
of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue34'
Rule 701 seeks to balance the trier of fact's need for relevant evidence against
the danger of admitting unreliable testimony. 42
Typical examples of the kind of opinion evidence contemplated by Rule
701 include a person's age, a person's anger or excitement, the value of one's
own property, a person's intoxication, distance, sound, or the speed of a vehicle.
Rule 701 allows lay witnesses to offer opinions where the facts could not
otherwise be adequately described or explained for the jury so as to enable the
jury to form an opinion or to reach an intelligent conclusion 43 The scope of
Rule 701 opinion testimony has begun to expand, however, with subtle
340. Stated most simply, lay witnesses may offer opinion testimony "if [their]
opinions or inferences do not require any specialized knowledge and [can] be reached by
any ordinary person." Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448,460 (5th Cir. 1996).
341. FED. R. EviD. 701.
342. WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, 1 701[02], at 701-10.
343. United States v. Yazzie, 976 F.2d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United
States v. Skeet; 665 F.2d 983, 985 (9th Cir. 1982)); accord Wactor v. Spartan Transp.
Corp., 27 F.3d 347,350 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Kreuger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 707 F.2d 312,317 (8th Cir. 1983)).
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graduation toward allowing lay witnesses to enter expert territory.3" It now
appears that "a lay witness with first-hand knowledge can offer an opinion akin
to expert testimony in most cases, so long as the trial judge determines that the
witness possesses sufficient and relevant specialized knowledge or experience
to offer the opinion."34'
The issue with respect to Rule 26 disclosures is whether parties must
disclose expert witnesses' opinions that properly fall within the ambit of Rule
701, instead of being governed by Rule 702. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) provides that an
expert's report "shall contain a complete statement of all opinions to be
expressed."' The Rule 26(a)(2)(B) mandate that "all opinions" an expert
intends to express be disclosed could be construed to require the disclosure of
simple Rule 701 opinions, as well as those opinions properly within Rule 702;
however, that is debatable in light of the rule's structure.3'7 Subdivision
(a)(2)(B) incorporates Rule 26(a)(2)(A) by reference; subdivision (a)(2)(A)
describes expert testimony subject to disclosure as that offered pursuant to
Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703 and 705.?' Arguably, then, parties need
only disclose expert opinions that fall within these three rules?49 Moreover, both
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and the corresponding 1993 Advisory Committee Note
repeatedly refer to "experts" and "expert testimony," further suggesting that an
expert's Rule 701 opinions need not be disclosed."
Some courts have held that undisclosed expert witnesses may nonetheless
offer lay opinion testimony under Rule 70l P In Hester v. CSXTransportation,
344. See Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng'g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1199 (3d Cir.
1995).
345. Id. at 1201-02. It is important to note that the Asplundh court went on to
observe that Rule 701 opinion testimony of a technical nature must be subject to "some
judicial gatekeeping" of the kind required by Rule 702. Id. at 1202. The court stated:
"While we are careful not to suggest that Daubert applies to Rule 701, we believe that
its spirit also counsels trial judges to carefully exercise a screening function with respect
to Rule 701 opinion testimony when the lay opinion offered closely resembles expert
testimony." Id.
There are key differences in the foundation requirements for expert witnesses'
opinions and lay witnesses' opinions. While Rule 703 allows experts to base their
opinions on inadmissible evidence, lay witnesses' opinions must be based on personal
perceptions and "unavoidably, those perceptions must be of a type that are admissible in
evidence." Hartzell Mfg., Inc. v. American Chem. Tech., Inc., 899 F. Supp. 405,408 n.2
(D. Minn. 1995).
346. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
347. Joseph, supra note 25, at 107.
348. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A).
349. Joseph, supra note 25, at 107.
350. See id
351. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Gust K. Newberg Constr.
(Vol. 62
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Inc.,3s2 for example, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court's decisibn to admit
undisclosed expert testimony that certain photographs were "misleading" and
"did not accurately depict the conditions" at a railroad crossing.P The Hester
court reasoned that such testimony was admissible because the expert personally
surveyed the crossing?' The court saw no problem with the testimony because
"even a lay person may testify to the accuracy ofa photograph of a scene that he
has personally viewed. '3 ss The DeBiasio v. Illinois Central Railroad3 6 court
held that it was not error to allow an expert to testify about his handling of
evidence, even though that testimony was not disclosed?" Because the witness
was testifying about matters within his personal knowledge, he was not testifying
as an expert. In short, his testimony as a fact witness "was separable from his
testimony as an expert.) 358
Allowing expert witnesses to offer undisclosed opinions because the
opinions fall under Rule 701 instead of Rule 702 runs contrary to courts' recent
attempts t6 better control expert testimony. There are several compelling
reasons for courts to reject the Rule 701/702 dichotomy. First, the line between
Rule 701 testimony and Rule 702 testimony is often difficult to draw. Second,
even if the line reasonably can be drawn, there is no valid reason to permit what
amounts to surprise expert testimony. Surprise testimony is exactly what federal
courts seek to avoid via the Rule 26 disclosure requirements. Third, attempting
to distinguish between Rule 701 and Rule 702 opinions offered by expert
witnesses encourages litigants to circumvent the disclosure required and the
discovery permitted by the Federal Rules. A convenient label here or a fuzzy
description there, and a party can avoid the sort of expert disclosure and
discovery that Rule 26 contemplates. Courts should not condone such
disingenuous practices. To the contrary, courts should actively combat such
conduct by way of pretrial orders and careful scrutiny of expert testimony.
Co./F.H. Paschen Group, No. 93 C 5219, 1995 WL 383133, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 21,
1995).
352. 61 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 815 (1996).
353. Id at 388.
354. Id
355. Id The plaintiff-who opposed the expert's testimony-was fither hurt by
his inattentiveness at trial. When the defense tendered the expert as having expertise in
the field of accident reconstruction "with the ability to analyze photographs," the plaintiff
did not contemporaneously object. Id
356. 52 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1040 (1996).
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2. Disclosing Treating Physicians' Opinions
In personal injury actions, plaintiffs' treating physicians commonly offer
what is surely expert testimony. Indeed, they are among the most regular
witnesses with specialized knowledge in both federal and state courts. That
being the case, must plaintiffs in federal cases disclose their treating physicians'
intended testimony under Rule 26?
The 1993 Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 26 provides that treating
physicians are not "employed or specially retained" to render expert testimony.35 9
Accordingly, treating physicians can be deposed or may be called to testify at
trial without the necessity of a written report satisfying Rule 26(aX2)(B)3w
Those courts that have considered the issue have adopted the position stated in
the Advisory Committee's Note 6'
A party's ability not to disclose a treating physician as an expert under Rule
26(a)(2)(B) has its limits. To the extent the physician testifies only to the
patient's care or treatment, the physician is not to be considered an expert even
though he may offer classic expert testimony.362 If, however, the physician's
testimony extends beyond facts made known to him in the course of the patient's
care and treatment and the physician is employed or specially retained to offer
opinion testimony, he is subject to Rule 26(a)(2)(B) disclosure.363 The
determining factor, then, is the scope of treating physicians' intended
testimony.3"
359. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
360. Id
361. E.g., Piper v. Hamischfeger Corp., 170 F.R.D. 173, 174-75 (D. Nev. 1997);
Harlow v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 94 C 4840, 1995 WL 319728, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ill. May 25,
1995); Wreath v. United States, 161 F.R.D. 448,449-50 (D. Kan. 1995).
362. See Williams v. Rene, 72 F.3d 1096, 1103-04 (3d Cir. 1995) (observing that
treating physician is "an ordinary witness," citing Rule 26(b)(4) advisory committee's
note for support); Bucher v. Gainey Transp. Serv., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 387,390 (M.D. Pa.
1996); Baker v. Taco Bell Corp., 163 F.R.D. 348, 350 (D. Colo. 1995) (treating
physicians testifying about plaintiff's treatment and examination were "ordinary
witnesses" and thus were not entitled to special compensation for deposition time and
travel); Wreath, 161 F.R.D. at 450.
363. Brown v. Best Foods, 169 F.R.D. 385,389 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (quoting cases);
Zarecki v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 914 F. Supp. 1566, 1573 (N.D. Ill. 1996);
Wreath, 161 F.R.D. at 450; see also Widhelm v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 591,
594 (D. Neb. 1995) (physician need only expand testimony beyond treatment and
reasonableness oftmedical bills to be deemed expert for Rule 26 purposes; no additional
requirement as in Zarecki and Wreath that doctor be specially retained or employed).
364. Patel v. Gayes, 984 F.2d 214,218 (7th Cir. 1993); Thomas v. Consolidated
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The current approach makes little sense. First, treating physicians do not
testify at trial-or by way of videotaped deposition-for free. Treating
physicians insist on payment for their time spent testifying and, since their
testimony is unrelated to the medical care or treatment of their patients,365 they
are "retained or specially employed" to render what can only be expert
testimony.3 Any witness who will offer expert testimony under Federal Rule
of Evidence 702, and who will receive remuneration different than statutory
witness fees and allowances, is an expert witness "retained or specially
employed" for Rule 26 purposesP Second, as it stands now, a treating
physician can offer expert opinions on complex issues such as causation without
prior disclosure. For example, a treating pulmonologist might opine that a
plaintiff's chronic respiratory distress is attributable to a single incident of
chemical exposure, even though that conclusion is not essential to the plaintiff's
care or treatment Third, and as the foregoing causation example demonstrates,
the line between expert medical testimony and treatment-based medical
testimony is often blurred. For all of these reasons, courts should in their pretrial
orders require parties to designate treating physicians as expert witnesses, rather
than taking the unsatisfactory path leading from the Rule 26 Advisory
Committee's Note.
3. Rebuttal v. Impeachment Testimony
Under Rule 26(a)(2)(C), a party must disclose at least 90 days before trial
or within 30 days of an adversary's expert disclosure under Rule 26(aX2)(B) any
expert testimony "intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same
subject matter" disclosed by the opposing party3 8 A party need not disclose
expert testimony to be presented at trial "solely for impeachment purposes"
under Rule 26(aX3)21 The question thus becomes whether expert testimony or
evidence is offered in rebuttal, or whether it is intended solely to impeach, with
the answer determining parties' disclosure obligations. Unfortunately, Rule 26
365. But see Baker v. Taco Bell Corp., 163 F.LD. 348, 349 (D. Colo. 1995)
(treating physicians' opinions on causation based on patient's examination are necessary
part of patient's treatment and do not make treating physicians experts for Rule 26
purposes); Salas v. United States, 165 F.R.D. 31, 33-34 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (same).
366. Cf Steele v. Seglie, Civ. A. No. 84-2200, 1986 WL 30765, at *2-*3 (D. Kan.
Mar. 27, 1986) (treating physicians who prepared written reports for plaintiff for
compensation were "employed or specially retained" in anticipation of litigation).
367. Smith v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 164 F.R.D. 49, 56 (S.D. W. Va. 1995).
368. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C).
369. FED. R. Cv.P. 26(a)(3).
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defines neither contradiction or rebuttal evidence, nor impeachment evidence,
nor does it attempt to distinguish between them 70
The distinction between rebuttal expert testimony or evidence on the one
hand, and impeachment evidence on the other, is critical. The failure to disclose
in a timely manner rebuttal testimony under Rule 26(a)(2)(C) mandates
exclusion of the evidence unless the nondisclosure was justified or harmless. 7 1
Nondisclosure in violation of Rule 26(a)(2)(C) probably is harmless where the
objecting party has ample time to depose the rebuttal expert or to thoroughly
discover the rebuttal evidence well in advance of trial?72
Rule 26(aX2)(C) contemplates the designation of new expert witnesses to
the extent they will offer true rebuttal evidence. The rule may not be used to
supplement the opinions of experts timely disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2)(B); the
use of the word "solely" in the second sentence of subdivision (a)(2)(C) in
conjunction with the phrase "to contradict or rebut" clearly expresses this
limitation. This interpretation of subdivision (a)(2)(C) is illustrated by Fuller v.
Volvo GMHeavy TruckCorp., 73 in which the court refused to allow the plaintiff
to name a purported rebuttal witness. The Fuller court held that because the
claimed rebuttal witness would, in fact, supplement the opinions of the plaintiff's
lead expert disclosed earlier, the expert's designation under Rule 26(a)(2)(C)
was both improper and untimely?74 The plaintiff should have designated the
expert as required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B) since his intended testimony was not true
rebuttal evidence?75
While impeachment evidence need not be disclosed under Rule 26(a)(3),376
its disclosure may still be required at trial courts' discretion. A trial court may
always require the disclosure of impeachment evidence in a pretrial order.377
Similarly, a judicial district is free to mandate the disclosure of impeachment
evidence by way of local rule.?7 '
370. Joseph, supra note 25, at 109.
371. Finley v. Marathon Oil Co., 75 F.3d 1225, 1230-31 (7th Cir. 1996).
372. See, e.g., Dixon v. Certainteed Corp., 168 F.R.D. 51, 55 (D. Kan. 1996)
(plaintiffs designation was untimely but six months remained before trial; thus, untimely
disclosure was.harmless).
373. No. 92 C 1797, 1995 WL 489542 (N.D. IIl. Aug. 10, 1995).
374. Id at *2.
375. Id
376. See DeBiasio v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 52 F.3d 678,686 (7th Cir. 1995) (district
court erred in excluding impeachment witness testifying as expert and evidence offered
to impeach should not have been excluded; however, error was harmless), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1040 (1996).
377. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
378. Id Local court rules are valid so long as they do not conflict with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Marshall v. Gates, 44 F.3d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1995);
Carverv. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451,453 (6th Cir. 1991). Valid local rules bind the parties.
[Vol. 62
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4. The Disclosure and Discovery of "Consulting Experts"
It is not unusual for a party to retain an expert to testify at trial only to learn
that the expert will render an unfavorable opinion?79 Similarly, a party may not
be able to call an intended expert witness at trial for practical or strategic
reasons38 Counsel anticipating or embroiled in litigation also may retain or
specially employ an expert without any expectation or intent that the expert will
testify at trial. Experts who function behind the scenes as consultants are often
of great benefit in shaping strategy, in crafting arguments or defenses, or in
formulating attacks on opposing experts' opinions. This last category of
witnesses truly may be described as "consulting experts," although attorneys
sometimes attempt to classify experts falling in the first two categories as
consulting experts?8'
The key question is whether parties must identify their consulting experts.
A logical reading of Rule 26 suggests that they must. Rule 26(a)(1)(A) requires
parties to disclose "each individual likely to have discoverable information
relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings."38 2
Consulting experts certainly fall into this category of witnesses. The analysis
does not stop there, however. Rule 26(b)(4)(B) provides:
A party may, through interrogatories or by deposition, discover facts known
or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by
another party in anticipation of trial and who is not expected to be called as
a witness, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery
to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means?' 3
See Silberstein v. IRS, 16 F.3d 858, 860 (8th Cir. 1994). Requiring parties to disclose
impeachment testimony would not conflict with Rule 26(a)(3) because the rule does not
preclude the disclosure of impeachment evidence, and because such a local rule would
honor the general intent of Rule 26(a). The Advisory Committee even mentioned such
expansion of subdivision (a)(3). FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note ("By its
terms, rule 26(a)(3) does not require disclosure of evidence to be used solely for
impeachment purposes; however, [such] disclosure... may be required by local rule
•...,. 
379. Bryan W. Smith, How to Prevent the Discovery of Opinions Held by
Nontestifying Fxperts, J. KAN. TRAL LAW. ASS'N, Mar. 1996, at 16, 16.
380. Id
381. See id
382. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
383. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(B). Rule 35(b) deals with plaintiffs' ability to obtain
reports prepared by medical professionals who examine them at defendants' request, i.e.,
reports of independent medical examinations. FED. R. CIv. P. 35(b). Because Rule 35(b)
has no application here, it will not be discussed further. For a case discussing Rules
1997]
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The purpose of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is to "prohibit a party from building its own
case through the use of an opponent's financial resources and diligence."' 4
Nothing in the language of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) suggests that so-called
consulting experts-nontestifying experts who are retained or specially
employed in anticipation of litigation-are exempt from the Rule 26 disclosure
requirements. The rule permits discovery of consulting experts' opinions "upon
a showing of exceptional circumstances."3 "s In order for a party to establish for
a court the exceptional circumstances required for discovery under'subsection
(b)(4)(B), the opposing party from which discovery is sought must necessarily
identify its consulting experts. Absent such disclosure, it is practically
impossible for parties to ask courts to make Rule 26(b)(4)(B) determinations.3 l
Certainly, a party served with an interrogatory calling for the identification of all
persons with information or knowledge relating to any rmatter alleged in the
action must identify its consulting experts in response.387
The fact that a party is required to disclose its consulting experts does not
mean that those experts' opinions are automatically discoverable. The
discovering party must still demonstrate that there are exceptional circumstances
justifying inquiry into the consulting experts' knowledge or opinions?88
Instances of exceptional circumstances justifying discovery under subsection
(b)(4)(B) are rareP9 The proper procedure is for a party to disclose its
consulting experts under Rule 26(a)(1)(A) or to identify them in response to a
proper interrogatory propounded under Rule 26(b)(1), and then promptly move
for a protective order under Rule 26(c) if necessary 3 °
26(b)(4)(B) and 35, see Crowe v. Nivison, 145 F.R.D. 657 (D. Md. 1993) (allowing
plaintiff to depose insurer's doctor who examined her before suit was filed; defendant
unsuccessfully argued that doctor was a consulting expert).
384. In re Interco Inc., 146 B.R. 447,449 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992).
385. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
386. Ofcourse, a litigant might accidentally discover a consulting expert's identity.
See, e.g., Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493,496-97 (D. Colo. 1984).
387. Baki v. B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179, 181-82 (D. Md. 1976)
(relying on FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)).
388. See Queens Univ. v. Kinedyne Corp., 161 F.R.D. 443,447-48 (D. Kan. 1995)
(discovery not permitted where noishowing of exceptional circumstances); Shipes v. BIC
Corp., 154 F.R.D. 301,308-09 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (same); Ross v. Burlington N. R.R., 136
F.R.D. 638, 639 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (same).
389. Dominguez v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 149 F.R.D. 158, 163 (S.D. Ind. 1993); see
also Brown v. Ringstad, 142 F.R.D. 461,463 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (party seeking discovery
"carries a heavy burden in demonstrating the existence of exceptional circumstances");
State Auto Ins. Cos. v. Briley, 140 F.R.D. 394,397 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (same).
390. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Rule 26(c) permits a party to seek an order that
discovery not be had, or that the scope of discovery be limited. Id
[Vol. 62
58
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/2
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Litigants should not view the simple designation of someone as a
"consulting expert" as a shield against unfavorable discovery. An expert who
renders a damaging opinion cannot be stripped of his testifying expert
designation and spared from deposition by reclassification as a consulting
expert.39' A party should not be allowed to rely on consulting expert
designations to shield from discovery those experts whose opinions were
rejected as the party shopped for an expert whose trial testimony would be
advantageous?- 2
Rule 26(aXl) requires the disclosure of consulting experts' identities, Rule
26(b)(4)(B) states how and when their opinions may be discovered, and Rule
26(c) provides a means by which the party employing a consulting expert may
resist discovery. If nothing else, decisions handed down since the 1993
amendments to Rule 26 make clear that parties must play by the rules. While the
opinions consulting experts hold enjoy some protection, the experts themselves
are not immune from disclosure, nor is the discovery of their knowledge or
opinions automatically off limits.
5. The Work-Product Doctrine and Communications Between
Attorneys and Expert Witnesses
In order for expert witnesses to assist the parties employing them, they must
be provided with a variety of materials and information about the case. It falls
to the parties to provide their experts with much of the foundation for their
opinions. "Communications between counsel and expert are essential to the
understanding and proper functioning of both, and are therefore crucial to the
prosecution or defense of a case." '393 Because litigants must ensure that their
The Tenth Circuit rejected this approach in,4ger v. Jan C. Stormont Hospital &
Training Schoolfor Nurses, 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1980). The Ager court held that the
identity of consulting experts, as well as their opinions, can be discovered only in
accordance with Rule 35, or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. hl at 503.
Thus, while a party must categorically disclose its consulting experts, it need not
specifically identify them (e.g., by name). Queens Univ., 161 F.R.D. at 447. This
approach makes little sense, however, since it requires parties to speculate about the
identity of their opponents' consulting experts. It also threatens to foster unnecessary
motion practice that might be avoided if parties knew the identity of their opponents'
consulting experts, thus allowing them to make considered decisions about related
potential discovery.
391. See Furniture World, Inc. v. D.A.V. Thrift Stores, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 61, 63
(D.N.M. 1996). But see In re Vestavia Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 105 B.R. 680, 681
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) ("It is within [party's] prerogative to withdraw the [expert]
witness and by its strategy limit [the opponent's] discovery.').
392. See, e.g., Coates v. AC & S, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 109, 110-11 (E.D. La. 1990).
393. Joseph, supra note 25, at 101.
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experts understand the relevant issues in the case,394 attorneys may share with
their experts documents concerning the attorneys' analysis of the case?9" In
other words, attorneys may share their work product with their expert witnesses.
The work product doctrine is both broader than and distinct from the
attorney-client privilege? The work product doctrine protects lawyers'
effective trial preparation by immunizing certain materials from discovery?"
The work product doctrine traces its roots to Hickman v. Taylor,39' in which the
Supreme Court sought to foreclose unwarranted inquiries into attorneys' files
and mental impressions in the guise of liberal discovery.3"
There are two categories or types of attorney work product.4°° The first of
these is commonly known as "fact" or "ordinary" work product, but is better
described as "tangible" work product.'0 ' Tangible work product includes such
documents as memoranda, notes, witness statements, deposition summaries and
the like. To qualify as tangible work product, the material sought to be protected
must be a document or thing prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for a
party, or by or for the party's representative. °2 The work product doctrine does
not protect from discovery facts concerning the creation of work product or facts
contained within work product, nor does the doctrine foreclose inquiry into the
394. Michael E. Plunkett, Comment, Discoverability ofAttorney Work Product
Reviewed by Expert Witnesses: Have the 1993 Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ChangedAnything?, 69 TEMLEL. REV. 451,451 (1996).
395. See Lee Mickus, Discovery of Work Product Disclosed to a Testifying Expert
Under the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 27 CREGHTON L.
REv. 773,773 (1994).
396. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508-14 (1947); Linde Thomson
Langworthy Kohn &Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 5 F.3d 1508, 1515 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (scope of protection under work product doctrine is broader than that attorney-
client privilege affords); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929
(N.D. Cal. 1976) ("The work product doctrine is an independent source of immunity
from discovery, separate and distinct from the attorney-client privilege.").
397. Handgards, 413 F. Supp. at 930.
398. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
399. Id at 510.
400. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 139 F.R.D. 556, 557
(D. Mass. 1991); United States v. Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 695, 697
(S.D. Fla. 1990).
401. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(bX3) (discussing discovery of documents and tangible
things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial) (emphasis added).
402. Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 167 F.R.D. 134, 139 (D. Kan. 1996);
PacamorBearings, Inc. v. Minebea Co., 918 F. Supp. 491,512 (D.N.H. 1996); Sackman
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Vermont Gas Sys., Inc.
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 151 F.R.D. 268, 275 (D. Vt. 1993).
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mere fact of an investigation. Facts gathered from documents by a party's
representative do not constitute tangible work product.
"Opinion" or "core" work product sometimes termed "intangible" work
produf,4s refers to an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or
legal theories concerning the subject litigation. Documents, or handwritten
notes on documents, may constitute opinion work product if they reflect an
attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories. °
In federal courts, the work product doctrine formulated in Hicknan v.
Taylor<°3 is now substantially codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(bX3).4 The rule provides in pertinent part:
Subject to the provisions ofsubdivision (bX4) of this rule, a party may obtain
discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
subdivision (bXl) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative
(including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer,
or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial
need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party
is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the
required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of
the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney
or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.41
Under Rule 26(bX3), tangible work product is discoverable only where the
party seeking discovery demonstrates both substantial need for the materials and
that it would suffer undue hardship were it required to procure substantially
equivalent materials some other way.P1 As the second sentence of Rule 26(bX3)
403. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dabney, 73 F.3d 262,266 (10th Cir. 1995).
404. Pepper's Steel, 132 F.R.D. at 697.
405. See, e.g., State ex rel. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. O'Malley, 898
S.W.2d 550, 552 (Mo. 1995).
406. See Cynthia B. Feagan, Comment, Issues of Waiver in Multiple-Party
Litigation: The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 61 UMKC
L. REV. 757, 778 (1993).
407. Snowden v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 137 F.R.D. 325, 332 (D. Kan. 1991).
408. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
409. Bogosianv. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587,592 (3d Cir. 1984). Some courts
hold thatHickman and not Rule 26(b)(3) governs the discovery of opinion work product.
See, e.g., United States v. OneTract of Real Prop., 95 F.3d 422, 428 n.10 (6th Cir. 1996).
In other words, Rule 26(b)(3) may not have entirely subsumed Hickman.
410. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
411. Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 976 (7th Cir. 1996); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 1994).
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makes clear, opinion work product enjoys greater protection.4 2 The discovery
of opinion work product requires something more than a showing of substantial
need and the inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship.4 13 While
some courts have held that opinion work product is absolutely immune from
discovery,414 that is not the position taken by the Supreme Court,41 and several
courts have rejected such unqualified protection.416 Even so, opinion work
product is discoverable '"only in very rare and extraordinary circumstances."'417
A critical issue is whether a party waives work product protection by
providing materials that would otherwise be immune from discovery to a
412. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) ("In ordering discovery of such materials when the
required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal opinions of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation. ') (emphasis added).
413. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,401-02 (1981).
414. See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d
980,983-84 (4th Cir. 1992); Toledo Edison Co. v. G A Techs., Inc., 847 F.2d 335, 340
(6th Cir. 1988).
415. See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 401-02 ("While we are not prepared at thisjuncture to say that [opinion work product] is always protected . . . , we think a far
stronger showing of necessity and unavailability ... would be necessary to compel
discovery.").
416. See, e.g., Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1422
(11th Cir.) (crime-fraud exception makes opinion work product discoverable), modified
on reh 'g, 30 F.3d 1347 (1994); Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d
573, 577 (9th Cir. 1992) (opinion work product may be discovered when mental
impressions are at issue in a case and the discovering party's need for the material is
compelling); Frazier v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 161 F.R.D. 309, 319 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (in civil rights case, plaintiff's need for opinion work product concerning
surveillance of her in earlier suit by defendant was compelling; discovery ordered).
417. Cox, 17 F.3d at 1422 (quoting In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir.
1977)); see also In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 607 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that "opinion
work product 'enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and can be discovered only in very rare
and extraordinary circumstances"') (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342,
348 (4th Cir. 1994)); United States exrel. Burroughs v. DeNardi Corp., 167 F.R.D. 680,
683 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (opinion work product discoverable "only in rare and extraordinary
circumstances"); Washington Bancorp. v. Said, 145 F.R.D. 274, 276 (D.D.C. 1992)
(opinion work product "receives almost absolute protection from discovery" and must
be produced only where party seeking discovery demonstrates .'extraordinaryjustification") (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809-10 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
Whatever heightened standard of protection may apply to opinion work product, that
level of protection is not triggered "unless disclosure creates a real, nonspeculative
danger of revealing the lawyer's thoughts." In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1015 (1st Cir. 1988).
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testifying exper t 8 Prior to the 1993 amendments to Rule 26, courts were split
on this issue. Some courts held that such disclosure did not waive work product
immunity,419 while other courts, relying on Federal Rule of Evidence 612,420 held
that the disclosure of work product to an expert witness exposed those materials
to discovery.'2 ' Still other courts deemed the work product doctrine waived in
such situations without regard for Rule 612. Discovery of work product
provided to an expert may enhance reliability in the fact-finding process by
ensuring that the expert will testify independently, rather than merely parroting
counsel's views, and by guarding against more subtle means of influencing an
expert's testimony.
Following the 1993 amendments to Rule 26, the discoverability of
communications between attorneys and expert witnesses must be analyzed in
light of the Rule 26(a)(2)(B) mandate that an expert's report completely state
"the data or other information" the expert considered in forming his opinions,424
and the Rule 26(bX3) protection of attorney work product.4  Rule 26(a)(2)(B)
does nothing to clear up the confusion surrounding the discoverability of work
product revealed to an expert; if anything, that subsection amplifies the problem
and makes the conflict within Rule 26 more explicit.426
Rule 26(aX2)(B) standing alone makes any tangible work product given to
an expert discoverable. The lingering question is what effect the rule has on
opinion work product. Nothing in the rule suggests that it abrogates opinion
work product protection and it should not be so construed. An attorney's mental
impressions cannot constitute "data or other information" within the meaning of
Rule 26(aX2)(B). "'Data' and 'information' connote subjects that are factual in
418. "Work product immunity can be waived by disclosures which are inconsistent
with the adversary system." Picard Chem. Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co., 951
F. Supp. 679,689 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (citing United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
419. See, e.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587,593 (3d Cir. 1984).
420. Rule 612 provides that if a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for
the purpose of testifying either while testifying or before testifying, "an adverse party is
entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the
witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony
of the witness." FED. R. EVID. 612.
421. See, e.g., James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144-46 (D. Del.
1982); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8, 9-11
(N.D. i1. 1978).
422. See, e.g., Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384 (N.D. Cal.
1991); Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404 (D. Colo. 1983).
423. Intermedics, 139 F.R.D. at 395-96.
424. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(2)(B).
425. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
426. Mickus, supra note 395, at 777-78.
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nature, not ephemeral like 'mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal
theories' of the sort protected by Rule 26(b)(3).1421
The discoverability of opinion work product shared with an expert is further
muddled by the interplay between Rules 26(b)(3) and b(4). Rule 26(b)(3)
distinguishes between tangible work product (first sentence) and opinion work
product (second sentence),412 while incorporating the subsection (bXl) limitation
that discoverable information is any matter not privileged.4 29 Attorney work
product does not constitute privileged material within the meaning of Rule
26(b)(1); rather, attorney work product enjoys qualified immunity from
discovery.43 "Privilege" and "qualified immunity" are not synonymous.
Courts have been reluctant to conclude that opinion work product protection
is waived under the post-1993 version of Rule 26 when protected materials are
shared with a testifying expert,431 although the possibility of waiver is ever
present4 32 The "interpretative wrinkle" concerning waiver lies in the first
427. Joseph, supra note 25, at 104.
428. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
429. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
430. Chiasson v. Zapata Gulf Marine Corp., 988 F.2d 513, 514 n.2 (5th Cir.)
(attorney work product enjoys qualified immunity from discovery, but such materials are
not "privileged" under Rule 26(b)(1) and thus beyond the scope of discovery), reh'g
denied, 3 F.3d 123 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1029 (1994); Joiner v. Hercules, Inc.,
169 F.R.D. 695, 698 (S.D. Ga. 1996); Zarrillo v. Bulk Materials, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 254,
257 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Rather than a privilege, the doctrine creates a form of qualified
immunity from discovery for documents within its scope."); EEOC v. HBE Corp., 157
F.R.D. 465,467 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (work product doctrine accords a qualified immunity);
Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Rebel Oil Co., 157 F.R.D. 691, 698 (D. Nev. 1994) ("The
work-product rule is not a privilege, but an immunity ... :'). Unfortunately, courts
sometimes describe the discovery protection the work product doctrine affords as a
"privilege:' See, e.g., United States v. Construction Prods. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464,
473 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 294 (1996); Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller,
Inc., 162 F.R.D. 289,295 (W.D. Mich. 1995); Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc.,
152 F.R.D. 2, 4 (D. Mass 1993); Vermont Gas Sys., Inc. v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 151 F.R.D. 268, 275 (D. Vt. 1993). This sort of imprecise-indeed,
inaccurate-language creates the potential for considerable confusion when analyzing
discovery disputes under Rules 26(b)(1), 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4).
431. See, e.g., Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. 93-2194 (WGB), 1995 WL
464477, at *6-*7 (D.N.J. June 16, 1995); Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 162
F.R.D. 289,294-97 (W.D. Mich. 1995); Maynard v. Whirlpool Corp., 160 F.R.D. 85, 87-
88 (S.D. W. Va. 1995); All W. Pet Supply Co. v. Hill's Pet Prods. Div., 152 F.R.D. 634,
638 (D. Kan. 1993).
432. See B.F.C. Oil Refining, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 171 F.R.D. 57, 63-
67 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that opinion work product shared with expert is
discoverable); Hager v. Bluefield Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 170 F.R.D. 70, 77-80 (D.D.C.
1997) (opinion work product held to be discoverable); Furniture World, Inc. v. D.A.V.
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sentence to Rule 26(b)(3), 433 which provides that subsection (b)(3)'s work
product protections are "subjectto" the provisions of subsection (bX4). 4 Rule
26(b)(4)(A) provides that "[a] party may depose any person who has been
identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial."435
The interplay between Rules 26(b)(3) and (b)(4)(A) was extensively
analyzed in Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc.43 In Haworth, the defendant
deposed the plaintiff's trial expert and, during that deposition, inquired into
certain product manuals that plaintiff's counsel gave the expert to review.4 37
Plaintiff's counsel objected on the grounds that the work product doctrine
protected the material from discovery. The Magistrate Judge handling the case
granted the defendant's motion to compel the expert to testify about all of his
communications with plaintiff's counsel.43 The Magistrate Judge concluded that
the discovery limitations in Rule 26(b)(3) did not apply to subjection (b)(4)(A),
governing experts' depositions.439 He supported his broad discovery ruling by
referring to Rule 26(aX2) and commentary!' 0 The plaintiffthen appealed to the
district court.
The Haworth court first tackled the interplay between Rules 26(b)(3) and
(b)(4)(A). The court observed that courts are split on whether the text of
subsection (b)(3) is subject to any condition or different standard found in
subsection (bX4).4" This split implies that counsel's opinion work product can
be discovered through an expert witness even though Rule 26(b)(3) instructs
courts to protect against the discovery of such material." 2 The court thus
determined that a "considered review" of Rule 26 was required. 3
Thrift Stores, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 61, 62 (D.N.M. 1996) (stating that all documents produced
to a party's expert witness must be produced on request); Georgou v. Fritzshall, No.93
C 997, 1996 WL 73592, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 1996) (parties must disclose all
materials provided to their experts; court ordered production of attorney-client privileged
materials possessed by expert); Kam v. Rand, 168 F.R.D. 633, 637-39 (N.D. Ind. 1996)
(holding that Rule 26 mandates "disclosure of those materials reviewed by an expert
witness"); Rail Intermodal Specialists, Inc. v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 154 F.R.D.
218, 220-21 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (applying balancing test that could make opinion work
product discoverable; court ultimately decided that balancing favored nondisclosure).
433. Joseph, supra note 25, at 105.
434. FED.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(3).
435. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A). •
436. 162 F.R.D. 289 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
437. Id at291.
438. Id
439. Id at 292.
440. Id
441. Id.
442. Id at 292-93.
443. Id at 293.
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The Haworth court reasoned that the "subject to" language in the first
sentence of Rule 26(bX3) governs the discovery of attorney work product absent
a contrary siandard in subsection (b)(4)(A)." While the court could find
different standards for the discovery of tangible work product, it perceived no
differing standard for the discovery of opinion work product. s After studying
Rule 26 as amended in 1993, and earlier versions of Rule 26(b)(4) and related
legislative history, the Haworth court could "find nothing in any version of
subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4), or the committee notes, that suggest core work
product was discoverable under subdivision (b)(4)."" 6 The court thus concluded
that the protection afforded opinion work product under Hickman v. Taylor"7
and Rule 26(b)(3) applies to discovery from experts.'"
The court next examined Rule 26(a) and the related Advisory Committee
Notes on which the Magistrate relied to bolster his decision that the plaintiff's
work product was discoverable." 9 The Haworth court held that Rule 26(a)(2)(B)
requires only that "all factual information considered by the expert must be
disclosed in the [expert's] report." 415 The court further observed:
The whole ofthe Committee Notes make [sic] clear that attorneys should no
longer be able to make work-product privilege arguments regarding materials
containing facts or assemblages of facts because they are obligated to disclose
all factual information on their own in a report rather than on motion of
opposing counsel. Any failure to so disclose requires that the information
may not be used at trial .... The new procedure simply eliminates the need
to have a judge order redaction of core work product from material that
contains discoverable facts and data.l
For the strong protection afforded opinion work product not to apply, Rule 26
would have to include clear and unambiguous language permitting discovery.43 2
The Haworth court could find no such language in the rule 3 The court
therefore remanded the case to the Magistrate for further proceedings, with the
plaintiff's opinion work product safe from discovery.45"
444. Id
445. Id
446. Id at 294.
447. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
448. Haworth, 162 F.R.D. at 294.
449. See id
450. Id at 295; accordAll W. Pet Supply Co. v. Hill's Pet Prods. Div., 152 F.R.D.
634,639 n.9 (D. Kan. 1993).
451. Hmvorth, 162 F.R.D. at 295 (citation omitted).
452. Id. (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 514 (1947)).
453. Id
454. Id at 296-97.
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Haworth is a well reasoned opinion.455 The court fairly and logically read
and applied Rules 26(aX2)(B), (bX3) and (bX4). Haworth permits some inquiry
into communications between experts and counsel,4 thus guarding against the
risk of the attorney unduly influencing the expert, while preserving the sanctity
of attorneys' opinion work product. Additionally, the Haworth approach
promotes efficiency in litigation by encouraging counsel and experts to
communicate freely. Had the court abrogated the opinion work product doctrine,
counsel and experts would be forced to speak hypothetically and otherwise
obscure their communications in order to avoid discovery. This result would
offend the very purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are
intended to maintain the quality ofjustice and improve the efficiency of dispute
resolution'1 7
B. Enforcing Fxert Disclosure: Rule 37
Parties' compliance with the Rule 26 expert disclosure requirements is
enforced by way of Rule 37(c)(1) ? ss A party's failure to comply with Rule 26
when disclosing intended expert testimony can be disastrous. The danger, of
course, is that the court will bar the expert's testimony altogether, or at least limit
the expert's testimony.!59 In Doe v. Johnson,' ° for example, the Seventh Circuit
455. The Haworth approach has been criticized. See, e.g., Karn v. Rand, 168
F.R.D. 633, 639-40 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (criticizing Haworth and declining to follow it);
Plunkett, supra note 394, at 478-79 n.247.
456. Haworth, 162 F.R.D. at 296.
457. People v. Carter, 678 F. Supp. 1484, 1486 (D. Colo. 1986).
458. Rule 37(c)(1) is fully set forth in the text accompanying supra note 336.
459. See, e.g., Coastal Fuels, Inc. v. Caribbean Pet. Corp., 79 F.3d 182,202-03 (1st
Cir. 1996) (experts who were not timely disclosed not allowed to testify); Sierra Club v.
Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 569-73 (5th Cir. 1996) (striking experts whose reports
were so incomplete and insubstantial that they did not satisfy trial court's discovery
order); Walsh v. McCain Foods Ltd., 81 F.3d 722,727 (7th Cir. 1996) (expert limited to
testimony in report and at deposition; expert disclosure never supplemented as required);
1st Source Bank v. First Resource Fed. Credit Union, 167 F.R.D. 61, 66 (N.D. Ind. 1996)
(precluding expert from testifying about subject merely listed in expert's report; listing
subject is not the same as providing opinion and basis for opinion); Upsher-Smith Labs.,
Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 1411, 1440 (D. Minn. 1996) (striking experts
whose "uninformative, boilerplate" reports "wholly fail[ed] to disclose, in any intelligible
way, the facts and rationale... underolying] the opinions expressed" therein); Paradigm
Sales, Inc. v. Weber Marking Sys., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (N.D. Ind. 1995)
(expert not allowed to offer opinion that was not contained in his report); China Resource
Prods. (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. Fayda Int'l, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 856, 866-67 (D. Del. 1994) (expert
who did not provide report not allowed to testify).
460. 52 F.3d 1448 (7th Cir. 1995).
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affirmed the district court's preclusion of the plaintiff's undisclosed expert
testimony even though defense counsel could have elicited the challenged
opinions at the expert's deposition but failed to do so.' The Doe court held that
the plaintiff had an affirmative duty to disclose the expert's opinions and that the
defense could not be considered negligent because it failed to elicit related
testimony." 2
The plaintiff in Sylla-Sawdon v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. 3 brought a
wrongful death action following an automobile accident allegedly caused by a
tire blowout. The district court entered a scheduling order that, with respect to
the disclosure of expert testimony, substantially tracked the language of current
Rule 26(a)(2)(B). At the time the court entered the scheduling order, Rule 26 did
not include its current expert disclosure requirements."4 The scheduling order
required:
Each party shall disclose ... any evidence that the party may present at trial
under Rules 702, 703 or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. This
disclosure shall be in written affidavit form, prepared and signed by the
witness and shall include a complete statement of all opinions to be
expressed, and the basis and reasons therefor; the data or other information
relied upon in forming such opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary
of or support for such opinions; the qualification of the witness; and a listing
of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or in
deposition within the preceding five (5) years.4 6s
The plaintiff engaged as her expert H. Boulter Kelsey, Jr., a mechanical
engineer. In response to the scheduling order, Kelsey submitted a very short
affidavit, to which he attached a copy of his curriculum vitae (CV).' Neither
Kelsey's affidavit nor his CV divulged any direct professional experience in tire
manufacture or tire failure analysis." 7 In contrast, Uniroyal's expert submitted
a five page affidavit detailing the foundation for his opinions, and his CV
revealed extensive professional experience in tire manufacture.46
Defense counsel notified the plaintiff's attorney that Kelsey's affidavit did
not comply with the scheduling order.469 When Kelsey did not supplement his
affidavit, Uniroyal deposed him. At his deposition, Kelsey testified that he did
461. Id at 1464.
462. Id
463. 47 F.3d 277 (8th Cir. 1995).
464. Id at 284.
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not consider himself an expert in rubber chemistry, tire design or tire
manufacture; that he had no formal training in tire failure analysis; and that the
knowledge on which he relied to reach his opinions bore no relationship to his
employment history.470 Kelsey testified that his purported knowledge about tire
failure derived from his years as a competitive race car driver, combined with his
mechanical engineering background.4 71
Uniroyal moved to exclude or limit Kelsey's testimony at trial, arguing that
he was not qualified as an expert under Rule 702 and that his testimony would
be more prejudicial than probative.4 The district court ruled that Kelsey could
testify, "but only as to the limited content of his affidavit and 'nothing else.' '47
The plaintiff attempted to call Kelsey as an expert at trial, and attempted to
qualify him by inquiring about his experience with tire failures other than that
contained in his affidavit or CV.474 Uniroyal repeatedly objected to the
plaintiff s attempts to so qualify Kelsey and the trial court sustained nearly all
of the objections.475 The plaintiff was thus unable to qualify Kelsey as an expert
and the court did not permit him to state that the defendant's tire failed because
of a manufacturing defect'47 Uniroyal prevailed at trial and the plaintiff moved
for a new trial, which the district court denied. In denying the plaintiff s motion,
the district court ruled that the plaintiff had "flagrantly disregarded" the
scheduling order's expert disclosure requirement.47 The plaintiffthen appealed.
The plaintiff argued on appeal that Kelsey was qualified as a tire failure
expert by virtue of his practical experience and, thus, that the district court
abused its discretion by excluding his testimony.478 The appellate court bypassed
the plaintiffs Rule 702 argument, focusing instead on her failure to comply with
the scheduling order.479
The Sylla-Sawdon court determined that Kelsey's affidavit did not comply










479. Id TheSylla-Sawdon court observed: "[Plaintiff's] request essentially asks
us to ignore her expert's cursory response to the district court's Scheduling Order, and
this we decline to do. Sylla-Sawdon failed to qualify Kelsey as an expert because he did
not abide by the scheduling order and Rule 26(a)(2)(B)." Id The court went on to
speculate "that plaintiff may have had difficulty qualifying Kelsey as an expert in tire
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specificity and thus failed to give the defendant advance notice of Kelsey's
testimony, without which Uniroyal could not prepare to meet his testimony at
trial. The Sylla-Sawdon court rejected the plaintiff's argument that Uniroyal's
deposition of Kelsey excused her failure to comply with the scheduling order.'4'
The court held:
The "sketchy and vague" nature of Kelsey's affidavit forced Uniroyal to
depose Kelsey to determine his qualifications and the basis for his opinion.
Consequently, the necessity of the deposition frustrated the purposes of the
district court's scheduling order and today would likewise frustrate the
purposes of Rule 26(a)(2)(B)As2
Because Kelsey's affidavit and CV did not satisfy the requirements imposed by
the district court's scheduling order, his intended trial testimony was properly
precluded1
A party's failure to disclose expert testimony as required by Rule 26 is not
always fatal.u Rule 37(cXl) contains two safe harbor provisions. Sanctions for
failing to disclose required information are inappropriate if the challenged
nondisclosure is "substantially justified," or if the nondisclosure is "harmless. '" 5
Related judicial determinations are fact driven, 4s6 but courts should be mindful
that Rule 37 sanctions are a drastic remedy warranted only in rare cases. 47 In
any event, whether Rule 26(a) violations are harmless or justified is a decision





484. See, e.g., Stevens v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 97 F.3d 594,600-01 (st Cir.
1996) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing expert to testify based on
information that was not timely disclosed where opposing party declined trial court's
offer of a limiting instruction and did not request additional time to prepare for cross-
examination).
485. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) ("A party that without substantial justification
fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1) shall not, unless such
failure is harmless, be permitted to use as evidence ... any information or witness not
so disclosed.").
486. Joseph, supra note 25, at 99.
487. Hinton v. Patnaude, 162 F.R.D. 435,439 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Imposition of
sanctions under Rule 37 is a drastic remedy and should only be applied in those rare
cases where a party's conduct represents flagrant bad faith and callous disregard of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.).




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/2
EAPERT TESTIMONY
Courts may consider a number of factors in determining whether a party's
failure to make a required disclosure was substantially justified. A court may
first wish to consider whether the party acted in bad faith in failing to disclose
the witness or information.4 9 Second, a court may consider whether the
proponent was simply negligent in failing to make the disclosure.49 This is
arguably part of a court's inquiry into a party's alleged bad faith in failing to
disclose required information; however, mere negligence (e.g., untimely
disclosure without substantial justification) is unlikely to excuse
nondisclosure.49' Third, a court may evaluate whether conditions or claims have
changed, or whether a disputed point is a surprise, such that the party alleged to
have a duty to disclose had no way of knowing that the challenged disclosure
should have been made. For example, the court in Friends ofSanta Fe County
v. LAC Minerals, Inc.4 held that the defendants did not have a duty to disclose
expert testimony on a point that the plaintiffs did not appear to contes.49
Similarly, courts may need to weigh several factors in order to determine
whether a party's failure to disclose witnesses or information was harmless.
First, and again, did the party attacked for nondisclosure act in bad faith?'4
Second, was the opponent prejudiced by the failure to disclose?49S Undisclosed
evidence should not be excluded if the opponent otherwise obtains the
information in discovery, or if the opponent has independent knowledge of the
information.4 A failure to disclose required information may not be prejudicial
489. See, e.g., Hinton, 162 F.R.D. at 439-40 (because party was delayed by "good
faith" motion practice, untimely expert witness reports were not excluded); 251 CPW
Housing Ltd. v. Paragon Cable Manhattan, No. 93 Civ. 0944,1995 WL 70675 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 21, 1995) (experts stricken because plaintiffs did not take disclosure obligations
seriously and willfully disobeyed Rule 26).
490. See, e.g., Edward Lowe Indus., Inc. v. Oil-Dri Corp., No. 94 C 7568, 1995
WL 683769, at *2-*3 (N.D. l11. Nov. 16, 1995) (omissions in expert's report were
inadvertent and were promptly corrected; expert allowed to testify).
491. See, e.g., Gem Realty Trust v. First Nat'l Bank, No. 93-606-SD, 1995 WL
127825, at *5 (D.N.H. Mar. 20, 1995).
492. 892 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1995).
493. Id. at 1351.
494. Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425,432 (7th Cir. 1995); see, e.g., Newman v.
GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 1995) (no reason to believe that
defendant acted in bad faith; nondisclosure was harmless); Hinton v. Patnaude, 162
F.R.D. 435, 439-40 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (harmless because no bad faith).
495. See Nguyen v. IBP, Inc. 162 F.R.D. 675, 680 (D. Kan. 1995) (failure to
comply with Rule 26 disclosure requirements "is harmless when there is no prejudice to
the party entitled to the disclosure").
496. See, e.g., Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Morrison-Quirk Grain Corp., 54 F.3d 478,
482 (8th Cir. 1995) (opponent learned experts' undisclosed opinions at deposition);
Watts v. Healthdyne, Inc., Civ. A. No. 94-2195-EEO, 1995 WL 409022, at *1-*2
19971
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because of timing. For example, in Apel v. Rockwell International Digital
Communications Division,4" the court found that the defendant was not
prejudiced by the plaintiff's inadequate expert disclosure because no trial date
had been set, and it had ample time to depose the expert and to designate its own
expert 98 The court in ABB Air Preheater, Inc. v. Regenerative Environmental
Equipment Co.4 refused to preclude expert testimony allegedly disclosed late
because there was "ample time to cure any alleged defect given the lack of a trial
date... ." Additionally, the defendant, whose untimely expert disclosure was
challenged, did not oppose the plaintiff's supplementation of its expert
disclosures in response.5 1 Third, has the opponent negligently or intentionally
turned a blind eye to the subject nondisclosure?"° Fourth, what is the impact of
the failure to disclose?s"s
Undisclosed witnesses may still be allowed to testify, or undisclosed
evidence may still be introduced, even in the absence of substantial justification
or where the opposing party is harmed by the nondisclosure. Notwithstanding
the language of Rule 37(c), a district court abuses its discretion if the exclusion
of evidence "results in fundamental unfairness in the trial of the case."5  The
"fundamental unfairness" standard articulated in Orfias v. Stevensons50 is so
(D. Kan. June 29, 1995) (both parties failed to disclose commonly known witness;
sanctions inappropriate); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Shared Communication Servs.,
Inc., No. 93-CV-3492, 1995 WL 555868, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1995) (document
already in plaintiff's possession so failure to disclose was harmless); Nguyen, 162 F.R.D.
at 682 (nondisclosure harmless where facts otherwise supplied); Eppler v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp., 860 F. Supp. 1391, 1396 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (striking only those witnesses that
were neither identified in interrogatory answers nor mentioned in depositions).
497. No. 92 C 6841, 1994 WL 275038 (N.D. 111. June 20, 1994).
498. Id. at *1.
499. 167 F.R.D. 668 (D.NJ. 1996).
500. Id. at 673.
501. Id.
502. See, e.g., Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 1995)
(plaintiffdenied receiving defendant's disclosures, but admitted receiving letter allegedly
transmitting them; plaintiff should have sought missing information; no prejudice to
plaintiff); Harvey v. District of Columbia, 949 F. Supp. 874, 877 (D.D.C. 1996)
(defendants should not have waited until day before discovery closed to complain of
inadequacy of expert's report).
503. See, e.g., Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp.
1333, 1351-52 (D.N.M. 1995) (expert opinion in affidavit supporting summary judgment
motion that was not previously disclosed was harmless because court denied summary
judgment).
504. Orjias v. Stevenson, 31 F.3d 995, 1005 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/2
EXPERT TESTIMONY
vague and amorphous, however, that litigants cannot reasonably rely on it to
shelter them from sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1).
IV. EXPERT WITNESSES AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Parties may consult with numerous experts before settling on one who will
testify at trial. Those communications are sometimes sensitive and significant,
as counsel may have to share their opinion work product or divulge confidential
information in order to judge an expert's suitability. Of course, a party may also
hire consulting experts unbeknownst to its adversary. What happens, then, if a
party communicates with an expert who has obtained confidential information
from an adversary, but who has not been retained by the adversary? What
happens if an expert with confidential information allegedly "switches sides" and
can actually or potentially use that confidential information to the first party's
detriment?
Conflicts of interest involving expert witnesses are an increasing problem
in civil litigation. Expert conflicts may severely prejudice both parties in the
case. A party who shares confidential information with an expert only to see that
expert join the other side is surely threatened by the exposure of key evidence
or the possible waiver of opinion work product protection. The party who
obtains its adversaries' confidences may see its key expert disqualified. Worse
still, the discovering party's attorneys may be disqualified,507 and the attorneys
may further be subject to professional discipline.5 8
506. See, e.g., Koch Refining Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178,
1181-82 (5th Cir. 1996); Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams, Co., 156 F.R.D. 575, 582-83
(D.N.L 1994); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Gracecare, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 61 (D. Md. 1993); Wang
Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1248-50 (E.D. Va. 1991).
507. See, e.g., Cordy, 156 F.R.D. at 583-84.
508. See Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing
ethical violations resulting from improper expert communications and engagement).
Rule 26(bX4XA) specifically provides for the disqovery oftrial experts. See FED.R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(4)(A). Rule 26(b)(4)(B) provides that a party may discover facts known or
opinions held "by an expert who has been retained or specifically employed by another
party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be
called as a witness" at trial only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of
"exceptional circumstances." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). Rule 3A(c) of the American
Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that a lawyer shall not
"knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules ofa tribunal except for an open refusal
based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3A(c) (1996). Attorneys who knowingly discover facts known or
opinions held by opponents' trial or consulting experts other than as provided in Rule 26
violate Model Rule 3A(c), thereby exposing themselves to professional discipline. See
ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 378 (1993)
19971
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Federal courts have the inherent power to disqualify expert witnesses,1°9
although instances of disqualification are rare. °10 In determining whether an
expert witness should be disqualified, courts generally apply a two part test.
First, was it objectively reasonable for the party claiming to have retained the
expert to conclude that a confidential relationship existed? Second, did that
party disclose confidential information to the expert?5 ' Only if the answers to
both questions are affirmative should the witness be disqualified.512 In other
words, if the party crying foul should not have reasonably believed that it shared
a confidential relationship with the expert, the expert should not be
disqualified." 3 If no confidences were disclosed the expert should not be
disqualified 14 "Confidences" must be something akin to attorney-client
privileged communications or opinion work product; "technical information" is
not confidential for disqualification purposes. st
Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co.516 is illustrative. The plaintiff in Cordy was
injured when he rode his bicycle over some railroad tracks. Sherwin-Williams
owned the railroad crossing. Plaintiff's counsel communicated with an engineer,
James Green, concerning his availability as an expert witness. 1 Plaintiffs
counsel spoke with Green over the telephone roughly ten times; Green and
plaintiffs counsel entered into a retainer agreement; plaintiffs counsel paid
Green a $3,000 retainer; plaintiffs counsel provided Green with a three-ring
binder containing counsel's investigative materials; and Green rendered at least
(discussing exparte communications with expert witnesses).
509. Koch Refining, 85 F.3d at 1181; Wyatt v. Hanan, 871 F. Supp. 415, 419(M.D. Ala. 1994); English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1501
(D. Colo. 1993).
510. Koch Refining, 85 F.3d at 1181.
511. Id; Wyatt, 871 F. Supp. at 419; Wang Labs., 762 F. Supp. at 1248; Mayer v.
Dell, 139 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1991); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Hamischfeger
Corp., 734 F. Supp. 334,337-39 (N.D. 11. 1990).
512. Koch Refining, 85 F.3d at 1181.
513. See, e.g., Wyatt, 871 F. Supp. 419-20; Mayer, 139 F.R.D. at 3; Great Lakes,
734 F. Supp. at 338-39; Nikkal Indus., Ltd. v. Salton, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 187, 191-92
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
514. See, e.g., In re Ambassador Group, Inc., Litig., 879 F. Supp. 237, 243-46
(E.D.N.Y. 1994); Wyatt, 871 F. Supp. at 421; English Feedlot, 833 F. Supp. at 1502-03;
Mayer, 139 F.R.D. at 4; Great Lakes, 734 F. Supp. at 339; Nikkal Industries, 689
F. Supp. at 191-92; Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271,280 (S.D.
Ohio 1988).
515. Nikkal Industries, 689 F. Supp. at 191-92.
516. 156 F.R.D. 575 (D.NJ. 1994).
517. Id at 576.
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one oral opinion 1 Green never provided a written report. Green subsequently
resigned as plaintiff's expert and returned the retainer.5 19
Sometime thereafter, a Sherwin-Williams attorney, Barbara Davis, called
Green. During their initial conversation, Green revealed that he had been
consulted by plaintiff's counsel.P There was some debate about whether Green
told Davis of the oral opinion he gave plaintiff's counsel 2' Green later sent
Davis a retainer agreement, which she signed on behalf of her law firm. Davis
then sent Green an engagement letter instructing him not to disclose to the
defense any information that he either received from or provided to plaintiff's
counsel.5 Green ultimately furnished Davis with a written report reflecting his
opinion that the plaintiff's accident was caused by a defect in the bicycle and not
by the railroad crossing.sn There was no evidence that Green ever imparted to
Davis any of the information he obtained from plaintiff's counsel. 24
The Cordy court easily concluded that plaintiff's counsel reasonably
assumed that he shared a confidential relationship with Green. Many of the
materials included in the three-ring binder that plaintiff's counsel sent to Green
were not subject to disclosure, and Green acknowledged that plaintiff's counsel
told him plaintiff's theory of the case and identified the defendants plaintiff was
targeting.P The evidence of a confidential relationship was "overwhelming. 526
It was simply impossible for Green to ignore that which he learned from
plaintiff's counsel 27
Having disqualified Green, the court went on to disqualify defense counsel.
Defense counsel did nothing to discover the real nature of the relationship
between Green and plaintiff's counsel.2 At the very least, defense counsel
should have communicated with plaintiff's counsel to ascertain the nature of
plaintiff counsel's relationship with Green before hiring him.P Whether Davis
or her firm chose to ignore warning signs or actually encourage Green's
misconduct was not a question that the court needed to answer. Either way,
defense counsel's conduct was "wanting."530
518. Id at 577.
519. Id
520. Id at 578.
521. Id
522. Id
523. Id at 579.
524. Id
525. Id. at581.
526. Id at 582.
527. Id
528. Id
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Expert conflicts are not exclusively a federal issue; state courts are also
called upon to resolve expert conflicts and disqualification issues5 3' In Shadow
Traffic Networkv. Superior Court,132 for example, a California court disqualified
the defendant's law firm based on its engagement of experts consulted, but not
retained, by the plaintiff. The Shadow Traffic court employed the standard two-
step analysis to determine whether the defendant's law firm should be
disqualified. 3 The court was not called upon to decide the experts'
disqualification, for they voluntarily withdrew from the case.53 4
Defense counsel argued that because plaintiff's counsel chose not to retain
the experts, their communications could not be deemed confidential as a matter
of law. 35 The Shadow Traffic court disagreed. The court concluded that
"communications made to a potential expert in a retention interview can be
considered confidential and therefore subject to protection from subsequent
disclosure so long as there was a reasonable expectation of such
confidentiality. """
It is common for opposing experts in narrow fields of specialty to know one
another, to be familiar with each others' work, and perhaps even to have worked
together." Many experts are intellectually curious sorts who do not hesitate to
call a colleague to inquire about a theory, to question data reported in an article,
to discuss new methodologies or studies, or to simply "pick the brain" of the
other expert. This is especially true where the experts share a personal
relationship forged through service or involvement in professional associations.
What if one party's expert consults with the opponent's experts? Must the
inquiring expert be disqualified? That was the issue in Palmer v. Ozbek.53
In Palmer, the defendants' expert, Dr. McCay Vernon, consulted with two
of the plaintiffs' experts for approximately two hours. That single two-hour
meeting was Dr.Vernon's only contact with the plaintiffs' experts.539 Plaintiffs'
counsel never communicated with Dr. Vernon, nor did they form a confidential
or fiduciary relationship with Dr. Vernon. The plaintiffs' experts did not
531. See, e.g., Graham v. Gielchinsky, 599 A.2d 149 (N.J. 1991) (absent
exceptional circumstances, courts cannot permit expert originally consulted by adversary
to testify).
532. 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693 (Ct. App. 1994).
533. Id at 699-705.
534. Id at 695.
535. Id at 699.
536. Id at 700.
537. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 734 F. Supp.
334,339 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
538. 144 F.R.D. 66 (D. Md. 1992).
539. Id at 67.
540. Id
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disclose any trial strategies or confidences to Dr. Palmer at their meeting; the
only information disclosed to Dr. Vernon was information that the defendants
were entitled to routinely discover under Rule 26.1 Accordingly, the Palmer
court easily concluded that Dr. Vernon should not be disqualified and denied theplaintiffs' motion.ll
Litigants can waive their claims of confidential relationships with their
expert witnesses by their silence or by way of inconsistent conduct. In English
Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Laboratories, Inc., 3 defendant SmithKline Beecham
(SmithKline) tried to disqualify plaintiff English Feedlot's expert witness, Dr.
Ned Brown, and English Feedlot's counsel, Holland & Hart. SmithKline had
retained Dr. Brown as a veterinary consultant in 1984 to investigate the potential
contamination of its cattle vaccines." In 1985-86, and again in 1989-91, Dr.
Brown consulted with and served as an expert for various SmithKline customers
who alleged that the defendant's vaccines were defective." Suffice it to say that
Dr. Brown shared the customers' view of SmithKline's vaccines.
Between his initial engagement by SmithKline and his subsequent
engagements by SmithKline's adversaries, "Dr. Brown repeatedly made his
opinions known through published papers, speeches and in conversations with
various veterinarians in SmithKline's presence. ' At no time prior to filing its
motion for disqualification did SmithKline ever object to Dr. Brown's
dissemination of information on confidentiality grounds. 4  SmithKline
essentially acquiesced to Dr. Brown's criticism of the company's products.
The English Feedlot court concluded that Dr. Brown and SmithKline shared
a confidential relationship,5" but noted that SmithKline did not divulge any
confidential informationto him.5" Even assuming that SmithKline had disclosed
confidential information to Dr. Brown, the company waived any claims of
confidentiality ss0
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege. In re
Blinder Robinson & Co., Inc., 123 B.R. 900 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991), citing,
Department of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 247 (Colo. 1984). "A
waiver may be explicit, ... ; or it may be implied, as, for example, when a
party engages in conduct which manifests an intent to relinquish the right...,
541. Id at 67-68.
542. Id at 68.
543. 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1502 (D. Colo. 1993).
544. Id at 1501-03.
545. Id at 1504.
546. Id
547. Id
548. Id at 1502.
549. Id at 1502-03.
550. Id at 1504.
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or acts inconsistently with its assertion." Id Here, SmithKline repeatedly
acquiesced to Brown's public criticism of its products. It is thus inconsistent,
after impliedly relinquishing this right for SmithKline to now assert that [the]
information [it gave to Brown] is confidential. Therefore, assuming arguendo
SmithKline disclose[d] confidential information to Brown, SmithKline
waived its right to assert confidentiality at this late date.P
The court thus denied the defendant's motion to disqualify Dr. Brown.552
The English Feedlot court further declined to disqualify Holland & Hart
based on Dr. Brown's engagement as an expert. Because SmithKline did not
divulge confidences to Dr. Brown, Holland & Hart was not "tainted" by its
relationship with him. "Simply put, there [was] no 'taint' to transfer."9553
The fact that English Feedlot involved so obvious and so public a waiver
should not be taken to mean that lesser conduct does not operate as a waiver. To
the contrary, conduct much more likely to be deemed a waiver is easy to
anticipate or identify. For example, a party might allow its consulting expert to
speak with its trial expert in order to help the trial expert form or shape his
opinions. Assuming confidential information passes from the consulting expert
to the trial expert, the party has surely waived any confidentiality claims that
might otherwise attend its relationship with the consultant or information given
to him. If a consulting expert's work forms in whole or part the foundation for
a trial expert's testimony and the sponsoring party does not object to related
deposition questions posed to the trial expert, the party should be deemed to have
waived any confidence arguments.
Courts should be reluctant to disqualify expert witnesses.5 4 Such
reluctance has one foot in policy555 and one in practice."5 6 As a matter of policy,
courts must balance competing objectives, an approach first announced in Paul
v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co."57 Courts following Paul balance (1) the need
to protect opinion work product and client confidences, and maintain the
integrity of the judicial process, with (2) the need to ensure that parties have
551. Id.
552. Id. at 1507.
553. Id at 1505.
554. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Gracecare, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 61, 64 (D. Md. 1993).
555. See Koch Refining Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1181
(5th Cir. 1996) (noting that some courts consider a third element of "public interest" in
addition to the two-party confidentiality test when weighing expert disqualification, and
citing cases).
556. See Wyatt v. Hanan, 871 F. Supp. 415,421 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (observing that
party claiming confidential relationship can take steps to protect its confidences); Wang
Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (E.D. Va. 1991) (discussing steps
that can be taken to avoid the disclosure of confidences).
557. 123 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
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access to qualified expert witnesses who possess useful specialized
knowledge.558 In conjunction with both elements, courts must be mindful that
if experts are too easily disqualified, unscrupulous attorneys and parties will be
encouraged to race to create inexpensive relationships with potentially
unfavorable experts in order to conflict them out of cases559 Such behavior
threatens the integrity of the judicial process by depriving courts of the benefit
of experts' knowledge and insight, and it deprives parties of the necessary
assistance of qualified.expert witnesses? 6°
From a practical standpoint, courts should rarely disqualify experts because
lawyers seeking to invoke confidentiality have the knowledge, experience and
ability to avoid conflicts; thus, they rightfully bear the consequences for falling
to take appropriate precautions551 A lawyer seeking to retain an expert and
establish a confidential relationship should make clear his intention to do so,
preferably confirming the engagement in writing 2 The lawyer should include
in the engagement letter an explanation of the expert's confidentiality
obligation 5P Work product communications should be prominently
558. See, e.g., Wyatt, 871 F. Supp. at 422; English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs.,
Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1504-05 (D. Colo. 1993). The Paul court wrote:
I recognize that any decision in this area has the potential to affect the way in
which attorneys and expert witnesses typically handle their affairs. I believe
that the ability of an attorney to communicate effectively with an expert
witness either for the purpose of determining whether the expert wishes to be
employed, or for the purpose of obtaining the expert's advice, is a matter
deserving of court protection. There may well be cases in which the attorney-
expert relationship with respect to a particular litigated matter is so strongly
established through proof of the existence of a formal and well-defined
relationship, and through proof of substantial work performed by the expert
relating to the case, that no testimony as to the nature of the communications
between the two is necessary in order for the court to conclude that, in all
fairness, the expert should not serve in any capacity for the opposing side.
Just as clearly, there are cases where the contact between the attorney and
expert is so minimal that to prevent the expert from serving for the opposing
side would be an injustice both to the opposing party and to the expert.
Paul, 123 F.R.D. at 281.
559. See Paul, 123 F.R.D. at 281-82.
560. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in fact, this practice is disturbingly common
and widespread. Attorneys who engage in this practice, however, do so at considerable
peril. Such conduct may be grounds for draconian sanctions and professional discipline.
See, e.g., Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298 (9th Cir. 1996).
561. Wyatt, 871 F. Supp. at 421.
562. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (E.D. Va. 1991);
English Feedlot, 833 F. Supp. at 1505.
563. Wang, 762 F. Supp. at 1250; English Feedlot, 833 F. Supp. at 1505.
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identified.' Counsel seeking to retain an expert should specifically inquire into
the expert's past employment in order to ferret out potential problems. 65
Experts must also be careful to avoid conduct that contributes to a lack of
understanding about the consultant's relationship with counsel and the
employing party." An expert who may wish to decline employment should
express his doubts clearly and unequivocally. 7 An expert who does not want
to share a confidential relationship with a prospective employer should decline
the engagement56 8 An expert who does not wish to be employed or at least
doubts his desire for the employment, or who does not *ant to be obligated to
maintain client confidences, should decline to accept information or materials
from the party courting him. 69
In a conflict of interest twist, experts who are retained to testify at trial, and
who are so disclosed and subjected to discovery under Rules 26(a)(2) and
(b)(4)(B), may change their opinions to favor the opponent. Such a change of
heart often results from new information provided to the expert. The issue then
becomes whether the sponsoring party can withdraw its designation and
foreclose the expert's testimony, or whether the surprised but obviously
delighted opponent can subpoena the expert to testify at trial on its behalf.
Moreover, if the opponent calls the expert at trial, can counsel elicit testimony
from the expert that he was originally retained by the first party? An expert's
admission that he was originally engaged by the party against whom he testifies
is potentially devastating: 70
It is difficult to predict how courts will respond in such situations, for there
is little precedent. The court in Peterson v. Willie"7' held that the defendant
could call an expert originally retained by the plaintiff who sided with the
defendant at his deposition.sn The Peterson court further held, however, that the
district court erred by allowing the defendant to elicit testimony from the expert
564. Wang, 762 F. Supp. at 1250. But cf. Ledgin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
K.C., 166 F.R.D. 496,499 (D. Kan. 1996) (court was unpersuaded by phrase "Attorney
Work Product' stamped on subject document, calling it "a self-serving embellishment").
565. Wang, 762 F. Supp. at 1250; English Feedlot, 833 F. Supp. at 1505.
566. Wang, 762 F. Supp. at 1250.
567. Id
568. English Feedlot, 833 F. Supp. at 1505.
569. Wang, 762 F. Supp. at 1250.
570. See 8 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHr Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2032, at 447 (1994) (describing such evidence as "explosive").
571. 81 F.3d 1033 (11th Cir. 1996).
572. Id at 1036-38.
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that he was initially employed by the plaintiff.m The Rubel v. Eli Lilly & Co.574
court declined to allow the plaintiff in a personal injury case to call the doctor
who examined her for the defendant, but whom the defendant did not identify
as an expert. The Rubel court concluded that the plaintiff should not be allowed
to call the defendant's doctor as her witness because his testimony would be
cumulative;7 s that is, it would overlap with the plaintiff's experts' testimony.5 76
Furthermore, the doctor's testimony would unfairly prejudice the defendant
under Rule 4037
An apparent key factor in determining whether a party should be allowed
to compel the testimony of its opponent's former expert is the availability to the
moving party of other expert witnesses on the same subject.578 Courts are
unlikely to compel an adversary's former expert to testify where the party
seeking to compel the expert's testimony has other experts available 9 In such
a situation, the party seeking to compel the testimony cannot claim unfair
prejudice if the court precludes the expert's testimony. If a court compels the
testimony of a party's former expert, it should not allow the jury to hear that the
expert was once employed by the party against whom he is testifying.80 Such
evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative. Additionally, jurors
might unfairly conclude that counsel for the party who first employed the expert
suppressed evidence that he was obligated to disclose by not calling the expert,
thus destroying the attorney's credibility.581
573. Id at 1038 (further holding such error to be harmless on the particular facts
of the case).
574. 160 F.R.D. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
575. Id at 460-61.
576. Id at 460.
577. Id at 461-62.
578. See id at 460-61; Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984).
579. See, e.g., Rubel, 160 F.R.D. at 460-61; Durfiinger, 727 F.2d at 891.
580. Unless, of course, the attorney who initially employed the expert cross-
examines the expert on his qualifications. An attack on the expert's qualifications surely
lends great probative value to the fict that the cross-examining attorney who now appears
so skeptical or critical once employed the expert in the same case. In that situation, the
party compelling the expert's testimony should be allowed elicit the expert's prior
employment by the opponent on re-direct examination. But see Steele v. Seglie, Civ. A.
No. 84-2200, 1986 WL 30765, at *5 (D. Kan. Mar. 27, 1986) (holding that such
rehabilitation is improper because of prejudice to party initially retaining the expert;
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 prevents such rehabilitation).
581. Grangerv. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Ariz. 1982).
19971
81
Richmond: Richmond: Regulating Expert Testimony
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
MSSOURL4WREVIEW
V. EXPERT WITNESS FEES
Most trial lawyers have, at one time or another, been shocked or angered
by the fees experts propose to charge for their services. Expert witnesses' fees
are often exorbitant 5l Experts frequently demand minimum deposition fees far
exceeding that which they would earn were they to charge their regular hourly
rate for the actual deposition time. Experts may charge the party deposing them
an hourly rate exceeding that which they charge the party employing them.58 3
Treating physicians may charge expert witness fees far above their regular
charges to their patients, a practice roundly criticized by reviewing courts 8
Federal courts have long recognized the problems posed by experts' abusive
fee demands, 85 as have state courts."58 Expert witness fees concern many
courts.8 7 As the Dominguez v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc.588 court lamented:
"Apparently the litigious nature of society has caused litigation participants to
forget the adage 'an honest day's work for an honest day's pay."'5 89 Fortunately
for "sticker-shocked counsel and their beleaguered clients," expert witness fees
are subject to judicial regulation.519
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(bX4XCXi) provides that absent manifest
injustice, "the court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert
a reasonable fee for time spent responding to discovery."5 9 The rule seeks to
582. See James A. Mellowitz, Whatever the Market WillBear: Fighting Exorbitant
Expert Fees, FORTHE DEF., Mar. 1995, at 2,2 (giving examples of exorbitant fees).
583. Courts disapprove ofexperts favoring one party over another when charging
their time. See, e.g., Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 141 F.R.D. 493, 496-97 (S.D. Iowa
1992) (refusing to allow plaintiff's expert to charge the defendant twice the hourly fee
charged the plaintiff); Draper v. Red Devil, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 46, 48 (E.D. Ark. 1987)
(refusing to allow plaintiff's expert to charge the defendant $10 per hour more than he
charged the plaintiff).
584. See, e.g., Hose v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 154 F.R.D. 222,224-27 (S.D.
Iowa 1994); Pierce v. Nelson, 509 N.W.2d 471,474-75 (Iowa 1993); Kirby v. Ahmad,
635 N.E.2d 98,99 (Ohio Misc. 1994).
585. See, e.g., Cotton v. Consolidation Coal Co., 457 F.2d 641, 646 (6th Cir. 1972)
(slashing expert's fee for short deposition).
586. See, e.g., State v. Lots Nos. 133, 134 and 135, 238 A.2d 837, 838-39 (Del.
1968) (affirming trial court's limitation of expert's fee).
587. See, e.g., Jochims, 141 F.R.D. at 497 ("Continuing escalation of expert
witness fees... is of great concem. The escalating cost of civil litigation runs the grave
risk of placing redress in the federal courts beyond the reach of all but the most
affluent.").
588. 149 F.R.D. 166 (S.D. Ind. 1993).
589. Id. at 169.
590. Mellowitz, supra note 582, at 2.
591. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(i).
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regulate expert witnesses' fees so that plaintiffs will not be hampered in their
efforts to hire qualified experts, while defendants will not be burdened with
unreasonably high fees preventing feasible discovery.592 The goal of Rule
26(b)(4)(C) is to fairly compensate experts for their time spent participating in
litigation, while preventing one party from unfairly obtaining the benefit of the
work of the opposing party's expert without paying for it59 Courts called upon
to make decisions "in this entropic field must be fair to the parties, equitable vis-
a-vis the witness, and comprehensible to the community at large. 's94
One of the first cases articulating a transferable standard for evaluating the
reasonableness of expert witnesses' fees was Goldwater v. Postmaster General
of the United States."s The Goldwater court identified six factors to be
considered in evaluating the reasonableness of an expert's fee within the
meaning of Rule 26(b)(4Xc). These are:
(1) the witness's area of expertise; (2) the education and training that is
required to provide the expert insight which is sought; (3) the prevailing rates
of other comparably respected available experts; (4) the nature, quality and
complexity of the discovery responses provided; (5) the cost of living in the
particular geographic area; and (6) any other factor likely to be of assistance
to the court in balancing the interests implicated by Rule 26.
The weight to be given any one factor in a particular case depends on the
circumstances presented to the court.sl
Consideration of these factors led the Goldwater court to reduce the hourly
fee for the plaintiff's expert psychiatrist from $450 to $20. sI The court
reasoned that an hourly rate of $200 was consistent with the rates charged by
other comparably respected psychiatrists, and that reducing the expert's fees
promoted the goal of allowing plaintiffs to hire competent experts without
unduly burdening defendants. 5
The court in Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd slightly revised the Goldwater
six-factor test to create a seven-factor test of its own. The Jochims' court first
eliminated the fifth Goldwater factor, the cost of living in a particular geographic
592. Hurst v. United States, 123 F.R.D. 319, 321 (D.S.D. 1988); Anthony v.
Abbott Labs., 106 F.R.D. 461, 465 (D.R.1. 1985).
593. Hurst, 123 F.R.D. at 321.
594. Anthony, 106 F.R.D. at 465.





600. 141 F.R.D. 493 (S.D. Iowa 1992).
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area. The Jochims court reasoned that the cost of living in a particular
geographic area is directly relevant to the reasonableness of an expert's fee and,
in any event, this factor is calibrated (at least indirectly) into prevailing market
rates.: 2 The Jochims court then added two factors: (1) the fee actually being
charged to the party who retained the expert; and (2) the fee the expert
traditionally charges on related matters. °3
The issue in Jochims was the fee the plaintiff's engineering expert, Dr.
Andrezj Nalecz, proposed to charge the defendant for his deposition. Dr. Nalecz
was charging the plaintiff between $150 and $250 per hour, depending on the
type of activity and when it was performed.14 He proposed to charge the
defendant $500 per hour for his deposition, contending that his deposition was
critically important; that it would be highly technical; that it would be stressful;
and that it would require thoughtful preparationo 5
The court's consideration of its seven-factor test led it to the "inescapable
conclusion" that Dr. Nalecz's $500 per hour deposition charge was "grossly
excessive,"' as well as "'unconscionable' and ."astronomical."" Again
applying its seven-factor test, the Jochims court concluded that $250 per hour,
the highest rate he charged the plaintiff, was the "outer limit" of a reasonable fee
for Dr. Nalecz's deposition time °l
Other courts have adopted the Jochims seven-factor analysis.l Again,
those seven factors are:
(1) the witness's area of expertise; (2) the education and training that is
required to provide the expert insight which is sought; (3) the prevailing rates
of other comparably respebted available experts; (4) the nature, quality and
complexity of the discovery responses provided; (5) the fee actually being
charged to the party who retained the expert; (6) the fee the expert
traditionally charged on related matters; and (7) any other factor likely to be




604. Id at 494.
605. Id
606. Id at 496.
607. Id (quoting Anthony v. Abbott Labs., 106 F.R.D. 461, 464-65 (DILI. 1985)).
608. Id at 497.
609. See, e.g., Dominguezv. Syntex Labs., Inc., 149 F.R.D. 158, 165 (S.D. Ind.
1993); Pierce v. Nelson, 509 N.W.2d 471, 474-75 (Iowa 1993); Kilsheimer v. Dewberry
& Davis, 665 A.2d 723, 735-37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), cert. denied, 671 A.2d 20
(Md. 1996).
610. See Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 141 F.R.D. 493,495-96 (S.D. Iowa 1992).
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State courts have also gotten into the act The issue in State ex rel. Lichtor
v. Clark u was the amount to be paid the defendant's desired medical expert, Dr.
Joseph Lichtor. Missouri has a rule similar to Federal Rule 26(b)(4)(c), 1 2 but
given the procedural posture ofthe case, the appellate court instead looked to the
trial court's inherent authority to impose reasonable conditions on the exercise
of discovery and to its authority granted by rule to design protective orders 13
The trial court had ordered that the plaintiffpay Dr. Lichtor $85 per hour for his
deposition time, far lower than the $300 per hour on which the defendant had
insisted. 4 Although noting that the trial court's hourly rate was "on the low
side" the Clark court nonetheless aflmnned the trial court's determination 5 The
court reasoned:
It is necessary for the protection of Dr. Lichtor that the hourly rate of
compensation be at such a level that neither party is particularly able to use
the monetary aspect as a lever to burden or harass the other party during this
discovery. If no fee is provided, or if the hourly rate is too low, plaintiff
could unduly extend the questioning of Dr. Lichtor. If the hourly rate is too
high, Dr. Lichtor or defendant casualty could attempt to prolong the
questioning. While the hourly rate of $85.00 allowed Dr. Lichtor is on the
low side, it would seem to be high enough to discourage plaintifffrom unduly
prolonging the deposition... 616
The question is not whether courts can regulate the fees that expert
witnesses charge, but should they regulate experts' fees? The answer is yes.
Experts clearly are entitled to reasonable fees, but an opposing party also is
entitled to reasonable discovery. Outrageous expert witness fees which make
deposition costs prohibitive and otherwise discourage discovery threaten the
fairness which should characterize modem litigation practice.
Perhaps no court has better expressed the need to control expert fees than
did Judge Selya in his entertaining opinion inAnthony v. Abbott Laboratories.67
InAnthony, the defendant noticed the deposition of Dr. Paul Stolley, a medical
school professor and one of the plaintiff's key experts. The defendant balked at
611. 845 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
612. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(4)(b) ("A party may discover by deposition the
facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify. Unless manifest injustice
would result, the court shall require that the party seeking discovery from an expert pay
the expert a reasonable hourly fee for the time such expert is deposed.).
613. Clark, 845 S.W.2d at 67.
614. Id at 58-59.
615. Id at 68.
616. Id
617. 106 F.R.D. 461 (D.R.I 1985).
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paying Dr. Stolley's hourly rate of $420P In reducing Dr. Stolley's hourly rate
to an "extremely munificent" $250,619 Judge Selya wrote:
For a person with little or no discernible overhead, a rate of $420 hourly
strikes this court as unconscionable. Based on a standard (40 hour) work
week, annualization would produce an income to Stolley of $840,000 yearly.
He may well be a genius in his field, but this court cannot find that even so
important and prestigious a profession as medicine has a right to command
such exorbitant rewards .... There must be some reasonable relationship
between the services rendered and the remuneration [sic] to which an expert
is entitled; and Stolley's all-that-the-traffic-will-bear approach falls well
outside the outer limits of the universe of rationally-supportable awards.
To be sure, we live in an age where a grown man may be paid a seven figure
annual salary to dribble a small round ball. But, the forces of the marketplace
are at work in such a situation: not only supply and demand, but the
variegated effects of the superstar's presence on attendance, television
revenues, and the all-hallowed won/lost record. And, most important, the
employer and the employee square off and bargain at arm's length in order to
determine an equitable stipend, each with something to lose and something
to gain. In the Rule 26(bX4)(c) context, however, such factors are noticeably
absent; the plaintiffs have handpicked the expert, andthe defense has neither
options nor bargaining power if it desires to obtain. the pretrial discovery
which the rule permits. Unless the courts patrol the battlefield to ensure
fairness, the circumstances invite extortionate fee-setting. 20
TheAnthony court concluded:
Our citizens' access to justice, which is at the core of our constitutional
system of government is under serious siege. Obtaining justice in this
modem era costs too much. The courts are among our most treasured
institutions. And, if they are to remain strong and viable, they cannot sit idly
by in the face of attempts to loot the system. To be sure, expert witness fees
are but the tip of an immense iceberg. But, the skyrocketing costs of litigation
have not sprung full-blown from nowhere. Those costs are made up of bits
and pieces, and relaxation of standards of fairness threatens further escalation
across the board. The effective administration of justice depends, in
significant part, on the maintenance and enforcement of a reasoned
cost/benefit vigil by the judiciary.01
618. Id at 462-63.
619. Id at 465.
620. Id at 464-65.
621. Id at 465.
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The time has come for courts to rein in expert witness fees.6 2 Regardless
of whether a court relies on Rule 26, a state equivalent, or its inherent power to
control discovery, it should analyze the reasonableness of expert witnesses' fees
as outlined in Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd.' The Jochims seven-factor test
best ensures fairness to both experts and litigants.
VI. CONCLUSION
Expert witnesses play a prominent role in litigation. Many cases boil down
to a battle of experts, and professionals from diverse fields and disciplines have
transformed service as an expert witness into a cottage industry. There are, of
course, positive aspects to expert testimony. Chief among these is the legitimate
assistance that experts commonly lend to courts and juries. Experts frequently
help courts and juries reach just results that would be impossible to reach without
expert testimony. On the other hand, 'Junk scientists" may mislead courts and
juries, prolong litigation and drive up litigation costs.
Apart from the broad policy issues attending the proliferation of expert
testimony, both courts and trial lawyers must understand the fundamentals of
expert witness practice. Absent such understanding, courts may wrongly admit
or exclude expert testimony, thus hurting one party or unfairly enriching another.
Trial lawyers must understand the judicial regulation of expert testimony
because the failure to do so may prove disastrous. More than one case has been
lost because a court excluded expert testimony, and conflicts of interest in the
expert witness context may pose a professional threat. Finally, clients'
increasing sensitivity to litigation costs may require trial lawyers to combat some
expert witnesses' exorbitant fees.
622. Thejudiciary apparently agrees. See, e.g., Hose v. Chicago &N.W. Transp.
Co., 154 F.R.D. 222,227 (S.D. Iowa 1994).
623. 141 F.R.D. 493,495-96 (S.D. Iowa 1992).
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